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This thesis will outline the temporal changes and choices of colonial powers and
individuals as expressed at historic frontier posts in the Midwest between 1683 and 1779 as
expressed through their supply and usage of gunflints. Gunflints exist as persistent artifacts at
historic sites, and especially so at fortifications like Fort de Chartres, Fort St. Joseph, Fort
Michilimackinac and Fort Ouiatenon. These sites exist within the same chronological
timeframe, from 1683-1779, and saw occupation by both the French and British, with nearby
indigenous groups, and should serve as instructive means to investigate the factors involved in
the supply, selection, and use of gunflints. The project examines gunflint distribution based
upon factors such as country of manufacture, style, and approximate chronological dating in
order to investigate the influence of political, economic, and military events of this time period
upon the availability and use of these artifacts. This study did not rely upon a trait based
analysis, but rather drilled deeper into the reasons for the choices these communities made when
selecting gunflints with different styles and places of manufacture. In this way, a more profound
understanding of a nation’s choices, as they pertained to gunflint modes and styles over time was
concerned. Similarly, the study took into account the various social, economic, and political
factors which affected logistical issues related to these interior forts to bring context and

understanding in the choices made by military, civilians, and indigenous populations in the
Midwest during this time period.
The pervasiveness of gunflints at historic archaeological sites in the Midwest makes them
a potentially central line of evidence about chronology, political and economic control, and trade
patterns during this period. While a chronological window narrowing the styles and types of
gunflints available to the different nations did not prove possible, differences in the metrics of
the gunflints at Fort de Chartres when compared to those at the other fortifications led to
questions of supply and choice by the British at this fort in particular. Previously unstudied
gunflints offered the opportunity for a thorough morphological, physical, and functional analysis.
Additionally, these assemblages offered insight into gunflints use, supply, trade patterns, and
choices by the military, civilian, and indigenous populations within these fortifications during
this period, and opened up the discussion of preferences in regards to styles and types of
gunflints. As the first real European presence in the interior, the French influenced political and
economic patterns with the indigenous groups. With later British penetration, and eventual
control, these patterns continued to shift, despite local French influences, with Fort de Chartres
representing an anomaly when compared to the other French-turned-British forts.

KEYWORDS: Colonial America, Gunflints, French and Indian War, Archaeology, Historic
Artifacts, Gunspalls
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
With the technological innovations in military weaponry in the mid-fifteenth century, the
widespread use of firearms became the standard choice for European infantry and navies.
Matchlock muskets first provided this change, as the ignition of the gunpowder came through the
use of a “match,” a wick-lick cord attached to the lock of the musket. In an effort to create a
more reliable sparking mechanism, the snaphance found creation in the very early seventeenth
century, with the introduction of a spark produced when a small shaped stone of flint would hit a
case-hardened steel frizzen. Further innovations brought along the flintlock musket by the first
half of the seventeenth century, with improvements brought to British and French militaries from
the Dutch and Lowland manufactures and exporters over ensuing decades.
From these early muskets, the quest to improve the array of sparks as well as sparking
reliability of gunflints inspired experimentation in shapes and sources of gunflint, especially as
continental conflict shifted suppliers and manufacturing centers. Even after developing their
own style and form of flintlock, Britain maintained their trade networks in order to obtain French
style flints, and would only later into the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century begin to
fashion their own styles of gunflints. Colonial demands and conflicts necessitated this.
Military and civilian sites across the American colonies yield gunflints. Archaeologists
have wrestled with the issue of dating and sourcing these gunflints, particularly since the late
1960s, in an attempt to differentiate between the nation of manufacturing, the source of origin for
the lithic material itself, and in discussing the logistical network of trade and supply of colonial
military fortifications. Most studies have focused upon the morphological characteristics of the
gunflints, most specifically the color of the stone, in linking the gunflints to a particular nation or
chronological period.
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The pervasiveness of gunflints at historic archaeological sites in the Midwest in places
like Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan make them a potentially central line of evidence about
chronology, political and economic control, and trade patterns during this period. This project
examined the temporal changes in the material aspects of colonial power and individual choice at
historic frontier posts in the American Midwest between 1683 and 1779. This narrow time
window was used in order to investigate gunflint artifacts from archaeological sites of both
French and British occupation. The forts of Michilimackinac, St. Joseph, Ouiatenon, and de
Chartres, spanning an area from the northern tip of Michigan to southern Illinois, provided a
variety of military experiences, illustrate the difficulties associated with organization and
supplying widespread interior fortifications, and dealt with the problems of defeated civilians
within the context of a military establishment. All of these issues are reflected within the
gunflint assemblages.
As the Fort de Chartres assemblage has had little analysis, its examination, and
comparison, to these other collections clarified significant differences of supply and distribution
between this site and the others. These sites serve as an instructive means to investigate the
factors involved in the selection and use of gunflints. Gunflint distribution based on likely
country of origin, style, and approximate chronological dating was observed in order to
investigate the influence of political, economic, and military events of this time period upon the
availability and use of these artifacts.
If the first step “in investigating a technology…is the object itself” (Skibo and Schiffer,
2009:7) then we must look at the designs and adaptation patterns of gunspalls and blades
between the French and British, and their colonial components in North America, in an attempt
to understand any advantages of disadvantages of particular styles, lithic sources, or nations of

2

manufacture of these gunflints. This project carefully considered the background of the artifacts,
from production to deposition, and examined the question of “preference,” as detailed in primary
and secondary source documentation as related to gunflint usage. In this way, the thesis
examined the reliability of previous tests on sparking capability, as well as statements made that
showed a reliance on the usage of French flints by the British, to illustrate the rationale behind
these choices. Prior literature was examined to ascertain the extent to which technical traits: the
size, color, type of stone, etc., influenced the choice of gunflints used, as well as how the
technology changed to accommodate the different styles of gunflints.
A comparison of the metric components of the different styles of gunflints, the gunspall
and blade/platform, and those of British and French manufacture, would offer insight into the
patterns of supply and trade, between both the inhabitants of these French fortifications and the
subsequent British who overtook them, and the British logistical issues afterwards.
Measurement comparisons between assemblages had the potential of showing patterns between
the larger, northern fortifications, and the outlier of Fort de Chartres, which was supplied across
different routes. Similarly, a comparison between British gunflints at Fort de Chartres and those
at the other three interior forts would show minor, but potentially significant differences in both
size and pervasiveness.
By quantifying the mere physical components of gunspalls and blades of British and
French manufacture found at Fort de Chartres, Ouiatenon, St. Joseph, and Michilimackinac,
differences in style, lithic composition, and assemblage compositions were noted. Site reports
and data exist for Ouiatenon, St. Joseph, and Michilimackinac, and the data amassed by my
efforts with the Fort de Chartres collection will help to illustrate these similarities and
differences. As a result, extrapolations relating to supply routes and issues relating to political
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and economic, as well as military events involving these forts reveal factors which impeded
British supply of their newly acquired fortifications. While past scholars have implied a British
preference for French gunflints over those of their own manufacture, at Fort de Chartres, British
gunflints make up a significantly greater percentage of the gunflint assemblage than at the other
three sites. Expediency and supply issues most likely impacted gunflint “choice” as much as any
perceived technological advantages. British technological adaptation, through the use of the
cock jaw basin, may have also affected the makeup of gunflint assemblages.
This study will begin with Chapter II’s examination of gunflints as an element of
technological change in the weapons of the 17th and 18th centuries. A review of the academic
literature on gunflint studies will provide the framework for understanding the terminology and
previous classification methods for this artifact, whether by mode of manufacturing, lithic
material, or color. Chapter III begins an examination of the four sites involved in this study,
outlining the history of the French and subsequent British occupations of these fortifications and
a history of the excavations of these areas. Chapter IV offers the data analysis portion of the
thesis through a thorough discussion of the gunflint assemblages, their metric quantities, and a
statistical breakdown of their percentages within these sites. It ends with a comparative data set
between the sites. Chapter V presents a discussion upon the topic of preference, as presented by
the literature review, but also from perspective of the primary source materials and
archaeological data. Careful scrutiny of the variables associated with gunflint performance are
also taken into account in analyzing this subject. The chapter concludes by looking at the issues
of logistics within the context of these interior forts, and how this may have impacted gunflint
availability.
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CHAPTER II: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Gunflints as Technology
With the early development of firearms, as matchlock muskets, European militaries now
had the means of igniting the gunpowder in their weapons through the use of a “match,”
essentially a long wick, as early as the mid-15th century. The desire for a more reliable method
to spark the gunpowder would lead to the progression from matchlock to snaphance in the very
early 17th century, with the introduction of a new method to fire powder, a spark created by the
striking of stone to steel. With firearms a recent innovation, the British and French relied heavily
on the Dutch, and to a lesser extent, the Germans within the Low Countries, for the
manufacturing and importation of flintlocks for much of the first half of the seventeenth century.
Dutch naval superiority only increased their domination of this trade (Blanchette, 1975:48).
When France and England did begin to produce their own flintlocks, only a Franco-Dutch war in
the 1690s provided the impetus. This sparked the innovation known as the “French lock.”
The development of the French lock solidified this form of ignition system, although the
size, shape, and materials of the flints used within these locks would themselves change over
time. While the French initially invented this type of lock, future locks would continue to be
called “French locks” regardless of where they were manufactured, yet they all retained key
characteristics: “a vertically acting sear, and the flint strikes the curved frizzen, or battery, at a
gouging angle as it plows its way downward towards the pan” (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:5).
The flintlock musket became the standard firearm of most European armies, and gunflints would
continue to provide the spark for ignition for another two hundred years (Lenk, 2007: 26-27;
Kenmotsu, 1990:93; Whithoff, 1966:13). By the time of the construction of the forts within this
study, Michilimackinac, Ouiatenon, St. Joseph, and de Chartres, the French lock had become the
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customary ignition system of the French as well as the British. As such, the styles of gunflints
manufactured first in places like France and, later, Britain, would fit within these locks, provide
the means of igniting the gunpowder, and see themselves factor prominently within military
supplies transported and stored within these interior colonial fortifications.
The Weapons of the 18th Century
The British military did not formally adopt the flintlock musket until the midpoint of the
17th century, and its use would still be sporadic for the next sixty to seventy years. In 1715, the
British government attempted to standardize its military, and better organize its supply service,
through the creation of the Board of Ordnance system centered at the Tower of London. This
allowed for the purchase of complete weapons, and contracts for large numbers of gunflints from
private contractors rather than materials that lacked uniform measurements and sizes, and
sometimes suffered from quality control issues (Stevenson, et. al., 2007:51; Bailey, 1972:9-10;
Bannerman, 2008:17). The responsibility for providing weaponry and related accoutrement, as
well as coordination of delivery of this to troops abroad, now lay with the Board of Ordnance.
Standardization of the British military musket occurred at this same time, with the British Brown
Bess manufactured in its “pre-land pattern” from 1715-1735, and the more typical “Land”
pattern from 1730-1797 (see figure 1, below; Bailey, 1972:13).

Figure 1. Long Land Pattern of the British Brown Bess, circa 1730s-1790s.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Long_Land_Pattern.jpg
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The regularization of this musket, and uniform system for creating civilian and trade guns,
allowed for a more uniform system in the production and measurement of gunflints as well.
While the British would continue to import gunspalls and blades from the French and through
Dutch intermediaries, a craft industry took route outside of London that would later expand and
allow for the domestic production of gunspalls.
French firearms, collectively known as “Charlevilles,” (see Figure 2 below) stemmed
from an arsenal created in 1675 where gun parts and locks were made and stockpiled. By 1717,
the military infantry musket that bears the name came into production and the standardization of
manufacturing of these instruments came into being. The musket would evolve through several
models in the 18th century, but would still collectively be referred to as the “Charleville”
(Gélinas, 2015:25, 27).

Figure 2. Close up of a French Charleville Musket.
https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/736x/f8/98/a5/f898a5766eac5ecd44ebb4a142335612.jpg
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Despite frequent reference to this style as the most pervasive French longarm in the North
American colonies, it appears to exist solely as a military musket, and the manufactures did not
make smaller, or lesser quality styles, for use in the civilian or trade markets. According to
Gélinas (2015:34), “primary source records reveal that very few Charleville shoulder weapons
may have seen use in New France contrary to popular belief. In addition, no evidence of
‘Charleville-made gun parts (i.e., locks or barrels showing Charleville arsenal markings) have
been found up to the present time in any pre-1760 French associated North American
archeological sites”.
Early French dominance in musket technology and gunflint manufacturing, undoubtedly
resulted in the presence of French-manufactured firearms and gunflints in military engagements
across Europe and European colonies in North America during the seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries. With the prominence of the French presence in New France (Canada and
the interior of North America), significant trade relationship and alignments with the indigenous
populations, not to mention strong military presences throughout, the existence of French-made
firearms and gunflints is hardly in dispute. Citizen Salivet, writing in 1797, commented that the
merchants of Saint Aignan shipped “considerable quantities” of gunflints annually to Holland,
Spain, and England and Citizen Coquebert record in 1793 some thirty million gunflints in
storage, stating that the “the English and Colonial traders were passing them along to their Indian
customers” (Hamilton, 1982:191). For approximately 150 years, French gunflints, both gunspall
and blade forms, found their way into the American interior and into the hands of military,
civilian, and indigenous users.
Both the Brown Bess and Charleville utilized similar technology and had fairly similar
measurements and components. Both of these smoothbore muskets utilized gunflints to ignite
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priming powder, which ignited the powder within the barrel, propelling the lead ball forward.
The Charleville’s .69 caliber musket was only slightly smaller than the .75 caliber Brown Bess.
Both, initially, used French gunspalls within their locks. Both, could, utilize British, French, of
Chip/Self-made gunflints, as well as blade styles. One question, neither addressed by
contemporary sources nor by recent scholarship or experimental archaeology, might ask whether
either variant of musket is better suited to one style of gunflint over another. In other words,
does a British Brown Bess fire more effectively with a British gunspall? Does a French gunspall
produce more sparks on a French Charleville? Modern recreations and tests have employed
reproductions of weapons, which often are made from modern materials (steel vs. case-hardened
wrought iron), or utilizing gunflints crafted from other types of lithic materials like Brazilian
agate, which may skew the results of spark showers, wear patterns, or the likelihood of powder
ignition, all of which would clearly have mattered to users of 18 th century gunflints. If
preferences existed by those that used them, as some recent scholarship has asserted, beyond
mere logistical supply or availability concerns, the primary documents should reflect these
issues. If French or British gunspalls, or French blades held a clear technological superiority in
their muskets, then a clear preference, reflected in the archaeological assemblages, should
demonstrate this. These topics will be addressed in a later chapter, utilizing the archaeological
data and primary source materials.

The State of the Field of Gunflint Research
With the prevalence of gunflints found on 17th and 18th century Euro-American and
native archaeological sites, archaeologists began to search for a means to discern the country of
origin, as well as chronological windows, for this omnipresent artifact. While earlier studies

9

have seen significant challenges and revisions, they did establish the framework for
contemporary gunflint studies. As we develop better technology that allows us to investigate the
geophysical structures and compositions of these source materials, we might better be able to
link original quarry sources to the gunflints produced from them. This might also help to
differentiate further the patterns of supply, trade, and use of gunflints in colonial America.
Other than direct physical examination, for example, only limited technological analysis
has occurred of gunflints. Microscopic analysis and geological properties of the gunflints
materials were first examined on gunflints found at Fort Michilimackinac. By analyzing
microscopic differences, they believed they could differentiate between “English” and “French”
styled gunflints (Hamilton and Emory, 1988). Durst (2009) utilized inductively coupled plasmamass spectrometry, acid digestion, and laser ablation to detect measurable differences in the
physical properties of gunflints found on a French shipwreck in Texas and those at a nearby
French fort of St. Louis. With this information, Durst demonstrated a statistical likelihood of
association of the base artifact materials, linking the chert to home quarries in France (Durst,
2009:23-24). In terms of the blade style gunflints found on La Belle and at Fort St. Louis,
Durst’s testing revealed “three locations as origins of manufacture...The samples submitted for
testing resulted in an almost identical match with the core samples from Meusnes,
France…several gray to grayish brown blade-type gunflints…also showed a nearly identical
match with the French source material from Meusnes” (Durst, 2009:25). While the British
gunspall samples showed trace-element concentrations that indicated British manufacturing, and
a common source origin, that origin point has yet to be located, making the identical matching
impossible (Durst, 2009:28). Little analysis of these sorts has occurred beyond the gunflints of
Michilimackinac and this small sample from Texas. Nor has any comparative study linked these
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two studies together or to other colonial samples. With this process in mind, further testing, over
a wider variety of core and worked samples, could help to refine further the data available and
perhaps better link colonial samples to their sources of origin.
Utilizing only the physical characteristics of the gunflints, John Witthoft (1966) first
established a basic chronology of European gunflints, outlining distinct phases of the evolution
of the artifact as well as revisiting the process of making the gunflints themselves. Later studies
(White, 1975; Blanchette, 1975; Kent, 1983) further refined the typology and dating, particularly
of 17th century gunflints, demonstrating the differences between those believed to have been
manufactured in Britain and those made in France. White, for example, offers manufacturing
methods for French and British gunspalls, as well as blades, and discusses the tools used in this
industrial process. Blanchette’s analysis of the Chicoutimi site offered a closed context, due to a
landslide, that offered new context on the dates of manufacturing of French blade style gunflints.
These same studies would refute some of Witthoft’s earlier categories. Kent (1983) would show
that Witthoft’s assertion of a “Nordic” gunflint was in error, perhaps due to translation, and
further outlines the differences between indigenous made bifacial gunflints and the earliest
European products. These categories primarily focused upon physical characteristics: color, size,
shape, and style.
Current scholarship brings into question the designation of these categories of gunflints
as “French” and British.” Noting prior studies, based on raw materials, colors, and
technology/style of manufacture, Ballin states that the “competing definition of ‘French’ and
‘English’ gunflints have made it more difficult to establish a reliable temporal sequence
(2012:166). This confusion stems from the fact that gunspall production continued well into the
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period where blade gunflints were introduced and used, with both nations manufacturing both
styles simultaneously.

Gunflint Terminology

Figure 3. Diagram of the Different Types of Gunflints
The four basic types of gunflints are shown here. 1-A D-shaped gunspall, typically attributed to
the French. 2-Square gunspall, with characteristics typically attributed to the British. 3-Square
Blade/Platform gunflint, with a style normally associated with the British. 4-Square
Blade/Platform gunflint associated with both nations, although the French generally continued to
shape the heel in the “D” form.

Early classification methods--Styles of Manufacturing
Do it Yourself—The “Chip” Style
With debate existing surrounding the chronology of the gunflint industry in Europe, a
definitive timeline remains problematic. Attempts to link nations who manufactured gunflints to
distribution in North American colonies, especially those within the far western interior, remains
even more difficult. With the invention of the snaphance (1570s), and later, flintlock musket
(1630), the accompanying gunflints serve as useful dating tools for interpreting historic sites.
Imported in large quantities, once the process of mass production began, gunflints appear
throughout colonial sites. Initially in the colonies, however, Europeans and natives had to
fashion their own replacement gunflints with the materials at hand (Kent, 1983:38). Gunflint
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manufacturing began as an offshoot of fire starters, with individuals fashioning their own
gunflints as needs arose. Some indigenous “chip,” or “do it yourself” style gunflints were
produced in the early decades of gunflint manufacturing, but the demand for a more effective
flint would drive innovation and produce the gun spall, or wedge-shaped type in the 1640s and
1650s (Kent, 1983:38).
The earliest style of gunflints, the chip, or do-it-yourself flint, appeared quite early
chronologically, upon the American continent, as early as the production of the first flintlocks in
the mid-1620s (Kent, 1983:34). In the absence of mass produced European trade flints, both
indigenous and colonial populations manufactured what they could with the materials on hand.
This style of gunflint appears in most early colonial assemblages along the eastern coast
(Luedtke, 1998:37). Production of this bifacial gunflint would continue through the midpoint of
the 1600s, decreasing in the Northeastern colonies by 1675 until their displacement with
imported gunspalls. Still, due to supply issues, these locally-made bifacial gunflints would find
themselves produced by flintknappers further west into the areas of Missouri, Nebraska, and
Texas (Kent, 1983:34). Kenmotsu describes these indigenous and colonial bifacial flints as more
square than European examples, with “all four edges carefully worked to an edge by secondary
chipping” (Kenmotsu, 1990:97). These chip flints represent what Witthoft described as Nordic,
“bifacially flaked by coarse percussion chipping. They are square to rectangular and pillowshaped, with their edges bilaterally symmetrical rather than beveled toward one face. Most of
them are tiny” (Witthoft, 1966:22). As individually-made tools, the functionality of these types
of flints rested upon the skill of the knapper, whether colonial, indigenous, or European. The
increased use of flintlocks, combined with an increase in European/colonial conflict would make
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for a transition into gunflint technology. Simply put, they needed a more dependable sparking
mechanism for their firearms.

Spall
This push for a mass-produced flint related to colonial demands, and perhaps more
importantly, to European demands due to increased use in the many wars of the 17 th century. A
more efficient, and mass-produced flint led to the development of an actual knapping industry in
France. Witthoft believed, however, that the French gunflint industry had its introduction in
about 1675 (1966:28), stating further that it did not exist as a regular trade item until 1740.
Evidence from a pristine Chicoutimi Indian site in Quebec has refined this date, demonstrating
that blade-style gunflints, composed of a blonde, and most likely, French, stone, had been
imported into the colony and traded as early as 1663 (Kent, 1983:32). White places gunflint
production in France (with an unspecified type, but most likely gunspalls) in 1643, with the
blade technique introduced there in approximately 1710 (White, 1975:70). He does, however,
make an important note that gunflint makers could have manufactured both blade flints and gun
spalls contemporaneously in different locations, which seems likely. The uncertainly, then,
surrounding the dating of blade and spall gunflints on colonial sites at this chronological point is
compounded. The manufacture of both of these types would have also impacted the trade of gun
flints in the interior of the American colonies, and could have the potential of throwing off the
dating of sites if using only gunflints as the chronological feature.
Replacing these locally-made gunflints, European traders introduced the “wedge” shaped
gunflint, or gunspall, made from European-sourced stone, onto the American continent in the
mid-1600s. Witthoft (1966) attributes this first to the Dutch, with evidence later contradicting
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his designation to this nation as manufacturers. White (1975), Kent (1983), and Hamilton (1987)
demonstrate that Witthoft made errors in translation and attribution of these to the Dutch, as well
as showing that the French originated the process (White, 1975:68). Instead of making these
items, the Dutch, instead, served as the middlemen in the colonial trade, transporting and selling
them to overseas colonies, as well as Britain. At least for the first half of the 1600s, the Dutch
merchant ships dominated those of France and England, but did not produce firearms or
ammunition to any real degree (Blanchette, 1975:47-48). Britain in particular, as well as France
relied on the Dutch imports of gunflints and ammunition from Germany to assist them in their
martial needs. Then, French exports through the Netherlands dominated the gunflint market.
Gunspalls represent a shift in stone ignition technology, a desire to find a more reliable
spark from the flint. As lock technology improved, the flints needed to improve. Witthoft states
that these new locks “had evolved in the direciton of a more acute striking angle between flint
and battery; the new flints were better adapted to a grazing stroke than were earlier bifacial
flints” (Witthoft, 1966:28). These spalls became much more uniform in terms of shape, size, and
mode of production fairly quickly, as well as throughout Europe. As this technique spread, and
as flintlocks became in more widespread use, this Clactonian style of production could be found
not only in Britain and France, but also the Netherlands and Denmark during the second half of
the seventeenth century (Ballin, 2012:119; Luedtke, 1999a:33; Kent, 1983:32).
Gunspalls differ from the chip style mostly in their manner of knapping. The gunspall
gunflint came into production, and its technique spread fairly quickly, with only the source of
stone and minor manufacturing techniques differentiating the gunflints between European
nations. Hamilton and Emery (1988:10) believe that the introduction and spread of the gunspall
style happened quickly, an easy transition from the Chip gunflints or fire steels. Through their
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research, they also note that firsthand accounts of gunspall manufacture do not exist. The
primary sources are not there. Still, they conclude, “the methods have been reconstructed from a
study of the waste, and perfect replicas have been made” (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:12). The
lack of primary source accounts of this have also led to some dispute, with French archaeologists
denying a formal spall gunflint production within France (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:31;
Luedtke, 199a:33). Still, gunspalls can be found in great numbers at French colonial sites.

Figure 4. Tools to Make Gunflints. (Photo from De Lotbiniere, 1977:37 ) From left to right:
English flaking hammer; French flaking hammer; English knapping hammer; French knapping
hammer.

The gunspall can be recreated by striking prepared cores or flint nodules directly, using
specialized hammers (see figure 4 above), which removes individual flakes which a knapper
would then retouch. “They typically have positive bulbs of percussion on the ventral surface,
opposed by a relatively flat dorsal surface. The working edge of a gunspall is the roughly straight
margin formed on its distal edge. This straight edge is sometimes formed naturally during the
reduction processes, and sometimes formed by removal of small thinning flakes” (Hamilton
1979:210). The retouching of these flakes would differ, primarily, between the British and
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French styles, with French spall heels “reduced through pressure flaking into a semi-circular” or
“D” form (Kenmotsu, 1990:98) and the British remaining untouched. Knappers could work
quickly, utilizing a wide variety of source materials, and create a fairly uniform product.
Despite some uniformity in shape and size, gunspalls still largely represented a cottage
industry style of production. Dimensions were not standard. Knappers utilized whatever flints
were available. In France, these stones were quarried, but the British tended to pick up whatever
was laying on the surface. This is demonstrated through the wide scope of colors of gunspalls,
as opposed to later blade, or platform, style flints. Core/nodule sizes varied, as would the
number of flints that could be made from them. A great deal of waste was produced in the
making of gunspalls. The size of the flint nodules could be smaller, which also helped to
encourage small-scale, localized production (Luedtke, 1999a:33). Even then, differences exist
within a particular nationality’s style of spalls. Over time, some changes occur.
Blanchette proposes more thorough methods of study of these abundant artifacts,
suggesting that the chronology of gunspalls could be narrowed. Blanchette, through a study of
gunflints at Burr’s Hill, a 17th century Wampanoag burial ground in Rhode Island, concluded
that spalls came in two varieties, those that exhibited retouching on the ventral surface and those
retouched on the dorsal surface (1980:69). Blanchette concluded that retouched ventral spalls
were most likely produced 1640-1770, with the dorsal retouched gunspalls manufactured only in
the seventeenth century (Luedtke, 1999a:35, Blanchette 1980:69). Luedtke suggests that an
increased focus on illustrations and photographs of both ventral and dorsal sides, looking for
these various flake scars, could help to refine this chronology in the way that Blanchette
suggests. None of the artifacts used in this study have been examined for these particular
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retouched marks. As a result, only a loose chronological period for the use of gunspalls can be
illustrated.

French Gunspalls
The earliest date for the transition from chip to spall/wedge manufacture of bladeproduced gunflints remains unclear. The earliest reference to gunflint production in France,
unspecified as to type, occurred in 1643 (Emy and de Tinguy 1964:24). As stated previously,
despite this reference and due to a lack of archaeological evidence, some French archaeologists
dispute the production of gunspalls within France. Still, gunspalls are evident at French colonial
sites. Fort Pentagoet, for example, in Penobscot Bay, Maine, existed between 1635 and 1654.
Archaeologists excavated gunspalls from that site (Stevenson, et. al., 2007:53). French style
gunspalls were also discovered at the Chicoutimi site, Quebec, which demonstrates a pre-1663
context (Blanchette, 1975: 49). While one could suggest that these were locally produced at the
Fort, Hamilton and Emery comment that “No evidence so far has been found to indicate even
small-scale production of gunflints of any type at any French colonial site.“ (Hamilton and
Emery, 1988: 31). Utilizing the color and type of stone, however, does help to narrow down the
possible nation of origin of these gunspalls, assuming that the composition of the stones are
inherently unique to France or Britain. French spalls, by far, tend towards a uniformity of flint,
which suggests deliberate acquisition of specific nodules in specific places (colors to be
discussed more later). Traces of cortex left on some flints similarly demonstrate that these
particular stones were mined (Hamilton and Emery, 1988: 30). A cottage industry, which
remained family-based, allowed for the manufacturing of these tools in specific localities within
France.
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British Gunspalls
Some further controversy surrounds the establishment of a British gunflint industry. The
narrative originally stated that French prisoners of war had introduced their craft to
contemporaries at Brandon in 1709 (White, 1975:68; Witthoft, 1966:36). Given the similarities
between English-produced flints at Brandon and French produced flints of the same period,
Witthoft suggests that the source of the British technique “must” have been this, and dates it
specifically to 1686 (Witthoft, 1966:36). Primary sources disagree. British Board minutes,
under Oliver Cromwell, inquired about a London gunsmith’s offer of pistols and 11,000 “flints”
as early as 1654, and in 1660, “5000 flint-stones by him cut” were requested from a different
London gun maker (De Lotbiniere, 1977:42). Clearly, some localized, craft industry of gunflints
had developed, and this was found primarily around London and to its southeast. A few decades
later demonstrates the continuation of this limited manufacture. A 1704 Board warrant illustrates
a discussion for 240,000 “English Flints for musquett [sic.],” which seems to demonstrate that
some sort of industry exists by that point (De Lotbiniere, 1987:155, 156). De Lotbiniere further
suggests that the designation of “English” flints differentiates not just a mode of production, but
that these flintknappers had duplicated and altered the French technique rather than just
purchasing and redistributing French goods.
While initially the government of Great Britain may have been content with importing
French gunflints for use in British firearms, with increased warfare in Europe, the British sought
to provide their own gunflints to their colonial and continental forces. The British government
had relied primarily upon matchlocks until well into the seventeenth century, but by the midpoint
of this century, a desire for a more reliable mode of ignition had developed. By 1650, the British
army formally adopted the flintlock musket for their infantry, but it would take another fifty
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years for its usage to become standardized. Obviously, this would affect the demand for the
meager British supply of gunflints. As the standardization of flintlock use continued, this
demand would increase. The French, on the other hand, had adopted the flintlock about forty
years prior to the British (Skertchly 1984: 3). Even then, gunflints would remain an unregulated
entity, and size limits, while perhaps “recommended,” did not seem to factor into the decisions of
the Board of Ordnance, who controlled the gunflint supply of the British Army and Navy from
roughly the early 18th century through the mid-nineteenth (De Lotbiniere, 1984:207).
Quite simply, no need existed for the British to develop a systematic method of gunflint
manufacture. The British government could fulfill their early needs through trade with the
French and Dutch (who traded in French flints). During the sixteenth and through some of the
seventeenth century, British military weaponry, ammunition, and gunflints largely came from
trade controlled largely by the “‘Dutch’, the Low Countries, then the London Gunmakers
Company (from 1637), through the peak of demand of the Civil War” and only then did those in
Birmingham begin to contribute to a trade that came under the control of Britain’s new Ordnance
System (Williams and Wilcock, 2015:32). While the Dutch and Low Country merchants may
have simply acted as middlemen, providing French supplies and gunflints to the British, it still
took Great Britain some time to truly begin their own gunflint, and gun, industry.
As De Lotbiniere had pointed out, by 1704, Board of Ordnance reports requested 240,000
“English Flints for musquett,” which clearly demonstrates some sort of English manufacturing
through craft production (1987:156). While they may have continued to purchase French flints,
France obviously, would have proven unenthusiastic to sell gunflints to her enemy in these many
wars. The British had to look elsewhere. Only when warfare increased in the colonies and upon
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the continent in the second half of the seventeenth century, and as flintlock use became much
more standardized, would the British find the need to develop their own supply of gunflints.
British spalls, as a result, vary from the French both in the stone used and the method of
manufacture. Rather than mining specific beds of flint, British producers utilized stone that
existed as an offshoot of the chalk industry (Stevenson, et. al., 2007:56). Early British writers of
gunflints record sites in the southeastern portion of England, most particularly near Downs and
the Salisbury Plain. Here, at the beginning of the 20 th century, Chandler recorded the discovery
of a likely site of manufacture, with “several unshapely pieces of flint showing signs of having
been flaked … Judging from the appearance of the cortex, the flint has come from the clay-withflints which caps the chalk in this neighbourhood.” (Chandler, 1917:360). Similar beds of flint
could be found much closer to the Ordnance Board’s office within the Tower of London, as there
existed “a small chalk outcrop at Lewisham, just across the Thames, and, only a few miles down
the river, chalk formations began in earnest both in Kent and to a much lesser extent in Essex”
(De Lotbiniere, 1987:154). Only later into the 18th century, sometime shortly after the American
Revolution, would the famous quarries at Kent and Brandon produce the more stereotypical
British platform, or blade, gunflint.
With this wide diversity of sites, where deliberate quarrying rarely occurred and knappers
were far more likely to pick up stones on outcroppings, British spalls exhibited a wide variety of
colors, unlike the homogenous nature of French gunspalls. British gunspalls at colonial sites
might be “beige, black, gray, and tan” (Stevenson, et. al., 2007:50). Chandler described his
surface fragments in 1909 as “of a pale honey colour [usually attributed solely to the French
stones], some pieces quite unpatinated, but others very slightly,” while at a different site, “black,
with bluish patination on the worked faces” (Chandler, 1917:360). Clay, in 1925, described
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samples as “dull and lusterless. They are made from a tractable, blue-black flint spotted with
cherty inclusions” (Clay, 1925:425). De Lotbiniere suggests that most of the wedge/gunspall
style of gunflints produced in Britain, and transported to the North American colonies, would “to
a large extent have been black with a brown translucency and occasional white spots,” and those
shipped after 1740 “a distinct increase in the number of grey-brown flints which would have
been rather duller and more opaque but again with whitish patches” (De Lotbiniere, 1987:157).
Perhaps due to the sheer amount of waste created by this style of manufacturing, the British as
well as the French were less choosy in the types and colors of flints selected for knapping. These
wide variations in color/stone, as well as the occasional similarities between British and French
colors/stone, force archaeologists to give colonial gunflints much more scrutiny and examine
other characteristics to determine a possible nation of origin.
The spall/wedge style of gunflint involves a trimming down through retouching of the
lateral edges and the proximal end (McNabb and Ashton, 1990:46). This is the process that can
help differentiate gunspalls between British and French manufacturers. While the initial
processes differ little, the amount of secondary retouching of those edges and ends can help to
show these differences. The British, typically, did not significantly modify their gunflints once
they had a flint of the approximate size. While secondary flaking of the sides may be in
evidence, they did not trim all of the edges in the manner of the French (Hamilton and Emery,
1988:13). This retouching, for British gunflints, would also generally leave a percussion scar
“on each side, at the ‘bed’ level” (Blanchette, 1975:46). Visual analysis should reveal these
scars, which would indicate a British manufactured gunflint. Similarly, only the French
gunspalls had a rounded heel, or “D” form. A more “square” gunspall would demonstrate
British manufacturing. Lastly, the measurements of British gunspalls demonstrate a length that
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exceeds their width (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:13). While the differences between gunspalls
are few, and not always found in every sample, given the appropriate context of an
archaeological assemblage, these clues could certainly help to assign a nation of origin (not
necessarily “use”) of gunspalls.

Blade/Flake Gunflints
Advancements in firearm technology, which standardized the equipment itself, and
perhaps a desire to find a more economical mode of manufacturing the gunflints themselves,
prompted a shift in the style/techniques of gunflint manufacturing. The gunspall, or wedge,
created a shape that caused it to fit insecurely within the jaws of the cock due to the prominent
bulb of percussion near the heel. Similarly, only the front edge would serve as a firing edge, due
to the shape (De Lotbiniere, 1988:41). As a result, the French sought a new technique, the blade,
or flake, gunflint.
Dating for this transition also remains a bit less specific, with Witthoft placing it after
1740 (1966:28). Durst, however, contends that the finding of blade-type gunflints on La Salle’s
La Belle demonstrates that this style existed well before, as this ship sank in 1686 (Durst,
2009:21). Similarly, Blanchette records blade type gunflints in a sealed context at the French
colonial site of Chicoutimi, with a terminal date of 1663. This implies that the French had begun
the production of blade-style gunflints not that long after gunspalls (Blanchette 1975:43).
Clearly, Witthoft’s later date needs revising.
The blade, sometimes called the “flake” or “platform” style of gunflint, varies from the
gunspall most noticeably in the shape, caused by the style of manufacturing. In the French and
British blades, the color and type of stone used also varies. Both nations would focus more upon
quarried stones, from particular areas, in an effort to seek better quality materials. The blade
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style of gunflint involved more technology and a further refining of the process, with direct
percussion by a steel hammer striking the core of a flint nodule, and then a snapping off of
appropriately sized pieces. The knapper then trimmed these with a chisel and roulette (Austin,
2011:85; Witthoft, 1966, 28). As weapons became increasingly standardized, a corresponding
need for a more standardized form of gunflint arose. The French did not perfect this technique
most likely until after 1740, and these flakes, or blades, quickly dominated their industry. This
style of production proved less wasteful of raw material and allowed for more production, in less
time, of what was perceived as a more effective product (Ballin, 2012:133).
It would not be until another three quarters of a century had passed that new methods of
gunflint manufacturing evolved in Britain. Hamilton and Emory (1988:193) avow that the
“technique for making the English flake gunflint was not introduced into that country until 1775,
and we have no archaeological evidence that it appeared on the American scene until well after
the end of the American Revolutionary War.” De Lotbiniere noted that the British Parliament’s
Board of Ordnance minutes of July, 1775, discussed a letter from an individual offering the “best
musquet [sic.] flints of a New Construction,” as well as enclosing samples of them. The Board
ordered 200,000 (De Lotbiniere, 1987:156). This style, the English blade gunflint, would
become more popular after this, especially given the trade constraints of the wars with America
and, later, Napoleon, and would continue well into the 20th century (Kent, 1983:39). Scholars
largely agree with this general chronology (White, 1975:70; Austin, 2011:86; Kenmotsu,
1990:95).

Organization Techniques—By Color of Stone
Archaeologists continue to use the color of the stone as a simple means of organization
and classification of gunflints. Obviously, color represents the most visible trait of the stone.
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Luedtke (1992:65) shows that the bulk of these cherts or flints “fall somewhere in the range from
white through gray to black,” noting that colors such as gold, red, and brown are also fairly
pedestrian. For those utilizing gunflints, classification by color remains the simplest mode,
although problems with this method clearly exist.
From the first major study on gunflints (Witthoft, 1966: 30-31), separating gunflints into
basic categories of color, thought to be linked to particular European nations as a result, would
help to identify artifacts found in strata on a site. Gunflints typically deemed “French” would
have a yellow color, a “waxy lustre” and would demonstrate “translucence” (Witthoft, 1966:31).
Kenmotsu describes this as a “honey-yellow or blond” color, which “often contains white
inclusions and occasionally a whitish chalk cortex” (Kenmotsu, 1990, 96). Carvalhaes, in a
study of Fort St. Joseph’s gunflints, utilized the Munsell color chart to refine further this
description, designating French flints in the range “from 2.5Y5/3 (light olive brown) to 2.5Y3/2
(very dark grayish brown)” (Carvalhaes, 2011:22). In 1796, Citizen Dolomieu wrote a Memoir
on the Art of Making Gunflints, noting some of these color differences, “the ones sold in Paris
come from the banks of the Seine and are ordinarily brown” (Dolomieu, 1960:60). Another
French source, François Pierre Nicholas Gillet de Laumon, wrote in 1797, noting that the cities
of Meusnes and Lye, in the Cher River valley, provided flints of the stereotypical blond colors,
while the mines at Cerilly and Coufy produced the brown flint corroborated by Dolomieu. While
blond, and to a lesser extent, brown remain the staple colors of the French flint industry, Carlyle
Smith, the translator of these early French sources, also noted that one mine, Vitray, provided
black flint (Smith, 1961:420).
One explanation for the differences in colors of French gunflints rests in the style of
gunflint produced by the various flints. French spalls at Fort Michilimackinac, for example,
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displayed remarkable uniformity. “The one unvarying characteristic is the material—a nonglossy translucent flint that ranges from a light brownish gray to a deep brown” (Hamilton and
Emery, 1988:30, 159). In this same study, the authors note that the flake, or blade, style of
gunflint utilized a different source of flint, a source which contained a different color of stone.
“It is unlikely that the spall gunflints were made in the Cher Valley (between Tours and
Bourges), the center of flake production, because, as was pointed out, the flint from which the
spalls were made is entirely different from that of flakes” (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:33).
Blade-style French flints largely represented the honey/blonde colored flints, with brown colored
flints producing the spalls, which came from an entirely different area.
While the French had selected specific sources of stone for the various styles of flints,
yielding fairly uniform artifacts, in terms of color, quite simply, the English did not. English
gunflints represent a variety of colors, from a number of locations, and would only later be
mined at specific a specific location, Brandon, yielding a specific glassy, black flint. Utilizing
Carvalhaes’ St. Joseph sample, and the Munsell color chart again, gun spalls designated as
English ranged from “2.5Y5/0 (gray) to 2.5Y2/0 (black), and many are quite mottled with white
and brown.” (Carvalhaes, 2011:22). Found across southeastern England, the cherts used in the
English gunflint industry varied widely in color. Chandler, in 1917, recorded a site twenty-miles
outside of London with flint “of a pale honey colour” and another site less than two miles away
where he described the flints as “black, with bluish patination on the worked faces” (Chandler,
1917:360). A few years later, Clay describes flints found at a site just northeast of London as
“dull and lusterless…blue-black flint” (Clay, 1925:425). Rather than deliberately mine for
specific materials, the British apparently used varieties of stone from, essentially, surface
collections at outcroppings. Only later, in the late eighteenth century, would the British gunflint
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take on its stereotypical glassy black description, as British knappers shifted their area of
production to the Brandon area, and the quarries there which contained this type of flint. This
coincides with the shift from the spall style of gunflint to the blade, or flake, type of gunflint.
Kenmotsu describes these Brandon flints, as “very dark, nearly black, translucent fine-grained
flint to a gray, opaque flint with inclusions” (1990:95).
Color, when matched with mode of crafting, has traditionally given the clues to a nation
of origin for gunflints found in colonial archaeological sites, yet this evidence does not remain
conclusive. Simply put, colors change. Chemical and environmental processes can alter the
original look of the stone and could potentially alter the findings and interpretations of sites as a
result. The difficulties of unilaterally classifying a gunflint by the color of stone can be shown
simply by examining the various strata of stone in any one source quarry. Typically, “not only
do different strata in the same quarry show divergent characteristics of colour and opacity, but
both colour and opacity can vary in the same flint nodule” (De Lotbiniere, 1987:157). Durst
agrees with De Lotbiniere’s conclusions. His studies of LaSalle’s shipwrecked La Belle also
noted the effect of prolonged submersion on stone. He observed that the gunflints would darken
after centuries underwater (Durst, 2009:22). This experiment demonstrates some of the inherent
difficulties of attributing a nation of origin as a source solely on the hue of the lithic material. It
also raises the possibility that French honey colored flints COULD be mistaken for English black
flints if found in a damp environment, or given other chemical processes that impact color
change.

Organizing Techniques—By Composition of Lithic Material
Closely linked to sorting by color, some archaeologists have attempted to use the
chemical and material properties of the stone itself as a way to link the gunflints to a nation of

27

manufacture. Durst, for example, notes finding blond blade-type gunflints on La Belle, which he
links as geologically-identical matches with ore samples obtained in France (Durst, 2009:25).
This seems to justify the classification system, largely based on color, established decades
previously. Durst’s study builds on an early comparison of the geology of the gunflints from
Fort Michilimackinac to other colonial sites done by K.O. Emery and T.H. Hamilton (1988).
These projects have linked gun spall flints at these sites to the geological makeup and sources of
the flints themselves. For example, French gunflints found at Fort Michilimackinac had the
same geological attributes as flint samples from the Santonian layers in France, while gun spalls
archaeologically linked to the British belonged to the Campanian age. While the Campanian
geological layer does exist in both France and England, Emery suggests that accessibility and
preference in each nation determined which rock was utilized (Emery, 1987:152). By this,
Emery means that the French intentionally mined particular types of stone, while the English, at
least in the early part of their gunflint industries, satisfied themselves with surface collection and
only small scale quarrying, which allowed for a wide array of colors and types of stone.
Both Emery and Durst’s studies also utilized fairly sophisticated technology to make these
linkages, expanding upon prior hypotheses. Emery’s samples came from flints sliced by a
diamond saw, with very thin sections observed through a petrographic microscope with
magnifications up to 300 times. This allowed the identification of specific mineral elements
(Emery, 1987:152). Durst believed that trace elements within the rock should appear consistent,
regardless of the color of the flint itself. He utilized inductively coupled plasma-mass
spectrometry, acid digestion, and laser ablation to yield his results. These techniques allowed
him to detect measurable differences between the samples, demonstrating the original source
material could be differentiated. The trace elements revealed through these techniques allowed
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the author to show a pattern of English, French, Danish, and indigenous/local sources for these
gunflints (Durst, 2009:23-24). No analysis of this sort has occurred beyond the gunflints of
Michilimackinac and the small sample from Texas. Further study into the Illinois
country/interior sites could help to link these interior sites into the larger trade network as well as
provide data to corroborate the dating of these sites.
Another issue in designating flints solely through color exists within the geomorphology of
the gunflint cores, despite the longstanding tradition of ascribing national origin by color. Durst
attempted to connect the La Belle and Fort St. Louis to the geological formations which
produced the stones in England and mainland Europe, noting that both “produce a wide range of
colors, including both gray and blond” (Durst, 2009:28). Durst also states “to my knowledge
there is no way to distinguish a black spall-type gunflint made in France from one made in
England” (email to author, April 13, 2016). With black flints found in French quarries,
alongside blond and brown cobbles at a workshop site in Porcheioux, and orange-brown flints
found in the gravels of southeastern England, the issue of relying only on the color of flints in
assigning a national designation for manufacturing remains dubious (Smith, 1961:423; Luedtke,
1999:73). As a result, only mass spectrometry analysis will yield the necessary information to
definitively link colonial artifacts to the production locations in Europe.
Another note of difficulty in linking a particular group’s use of a particular style of
gunflint exists with the complex stratigraphy of successive occupations of these particular sites.
Fort Michilimackinac, for example, had French inhabitants from 1715 until 1761, when the
British assumed control. Three separate incarnations of Fort de Chartres existed between the
establishment of it in 1720 and its surrender to the British in 1763. The French fort of Ouiatenon
began construction in 1717, and was in use until British takeover in 1761. Simply because the
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flints remain at the site does not necessitate a linkage to the British or French. The British, for
example, could easily re-use French gunflints—and may have preferred them to existing English
flints. Emery suggests this at Michilimackinac (Emery, 1987:148). Still, British primary sources
which discuss gunflints mention both sides of this issue, which will be discussed further later.
Existing trade networks may have proven more reliable than crafting new ones. Political and
economic issues, never mind militaristic, may have impacted the availability of these items in the
interior of America. These questions demonstrate why further analysis is necessary, especially
in the Illinois Country. As will be shown in later chapters, classifying these gunflints by their
manufacturing characteristics, by their form and shape, yield much more relevant data in linking
them to a potential nation of manufacture, but only the primary sources, combined with secure
archaeological contexts, will yield any information regarding usage patterns.
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CHAPTER III: SITES INVOLVED: A BRIEF HISTORY
The French occupied forts and civilian sites in the Illinois Country/Midwest throughout
much of the 17th century and well into the 18th century. Fort de Chartres, in southern Illinois,
established by the French in 1720, saw a British takeover in 1763. Nearby Spanish St. Louis was
begun in 1764, and obviously influenced this interior fort (Spanbauer, 2005). Fort
Michilimackinac, in far northern Michigan, built in 1715, existed as a French possession until
1761, when the British occupied it (Hamilton and Emory, 1988). Fort Ouiatenon, in western
Indiana, began under a French flag in 1717 until British takeover in 1761. The British would
evacuate around 1778 while fighting the colonials. Fort St. Joseph, established by the French in
southwestern Michigan in 1691, continued under the British from 1763 until Jay’s Treaty in
1795. Gunflint data from these sites will yield a wide range of chronological and geographical
information that will establish a significant contribution to our understanding of this type of
artifact’s usage and distribution in the Midwest. One of the difficulties in assigning a linkage
between usage of particular styles of gunflints and the inhabitants of particular fortifications lay
in the fact that at most of these garrisons, French civilians lived within the walls long after the
British took over ownership and control. This makes definitive associations of British soldiers
using French gunflints, for example, problematic in places like Michilimackinac, St. Joseph, and
Ouiatenon. In Fort de Chartres, however, French civilians were excluded to outside of the fort’s
walls.
The discussions of these artifacts, to date, have done little to discuss the impact of the
history upon the availability of particular types or styles of gunflints in the interior of the
American colonies. A discussion of the specific assemblages found at these inland forts and
civilian/indigenous sites should also consider the influence of political and economic events
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upon the trade and supply patterns of the British, French, Spanish, and later, Americans. The
British, for example, fought a succession of global conflicts during the late 17th and throughout
the 18th centuries which would have impacted and influenced the availability of both gunspalls,
and later, blades-type gunflints. King William’s War (1688-1697), Queen Anne’s War/War of
Spanish Succession (1702-1713), the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), the War of
Jenkin’s Ear (against Spain, 1739-1742), the War of Austrian Succession (1742-1748), the Seven
Years War/French & Indian War (1754-1763), Pontiac’s Rebellion (1763-1766), and the
American Revolution (1775-1783) would have involved Britain and France, their colonial
cohorts, indigenous allies, and clearly would have impacted trade patterns and the availability of
gunflints within the interior of the continent. This project would examine these assemblages and
attempt to make these linkages.
Similarly, economic issues also impacted the ability of the colonists and military officials to
obtain needed gunflints. Disruptions of trade by war, embargoes, or simply logistics affected the
supply of gunflints at these sites. Prior to the French and Indian War (1754-1763), the British
ruled their colonies through a form of salutary neglect, an unofficial policy that allowed lax
enforcement of laws and tax collection. After this war, however, British officials curtailed the
availability of French trade goods and enforced strict importation of British goods. The Stamp
Act (1765), Revenue Act (1767), and resultant boycotts and nonimportation agreements by
American colonists also impacted trade and trade goods availability. On some of these interior
sites, the British occupation lasted only a very short time until the sites were abandoned or the
Americans took over during, or after, the Revolutionary War. As a result, these assemblages
should reflect the accessibility of British and/or French gunspalls and blade gunflints through
offering a very specific reflection of this time period. This project would also attempt to
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examine these trade patterns. Given the relatively short period of time in which the British
occupied places like Fort de Chartres (1763-1772), Fort Ouiatenon (1763-1778), and Fort
Michilimackinac (1761-1779), an examination of these assemblages, through site reports and
direct observation, should show answer these many questions.

Figure 5: A Map of the Forts Used in This Study.
Fort locations are indicated by an open dot. Fort Michilmackinac’s location is on the Straits of
Mackinac between Lakes Michigan and Huron. This map of the British Colonies in North
America, created by William Robert Shepherd in 1911 currently exists in the public domain at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illinois_Country#/media/File:British_colonies_1763-76_shepherd1923.PNG

A Brief History of the Fortifications
Fort St. Joseph
Fort St. Joseph, in southwestern Michigan, was created as a French mission and trading
post in 1691 along the St. Joseph River in modern day Niles, Michigan. With a garrison of
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twenty men, the French fort saw prominence as a trading post with local indigenous groups of
Miami and Potawatomi but control changed over to the British in 1761 (Carvalhaes, 2011). The
British forces of Fort St. Joseph, like many interior forts, would surrender briefly to Pontiac’s
confederacy in 1763, but the fort would remain a British possession until 1781. In that year,
Spanish, French, and indigenous forces from St. Louis attacked the fort, which would never see
occupation again.

Fort Ouiatenon
Fort Ouiatenon, in the Wabash River Valley of western Indiana, was established by the
French in 1717 as a means to prevent British expansion into the region. The French hoped to
ally with local tribes, establish trading partners, and set a French presence firmly in this region
(Noble, 1991). Over the next decades, increased trade would bring more French colonists to the
region as well as indigenous groups. With the defeat of the French in the Seven Years War, the
British marched from Detroit in 1761 to occupy Fort Ouiatenon. Fort Ouiatenon would see a
brief surrender to Pontiac’s forces in 1763, and British fiscal and military policies would
eventually see this fort eventually diminished in size and importance until it fell to the
Americans during the American Revolutionary War (Noble, 1991:67).

Fort de Chartres
The French established their control of the Illinois country with the building Fort de
Chartres in 1718. They would build three different versions of this fort, with the last, a stone
fortification, completed between 1753 and 1756. From here, the French would maintain crucial
alliances with local indigenous tribes, carry on a lively trade, and solidify their control over the
Midwest, supplying it not from Canada, but by going upriver from New Orleans. Following the
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French and Indian War, this post, too, would transfer to the British, although they would not be
able to claim their new post until 1765. British traders would then begin to make the journey
down the Ohio to carry on the trade and supply with the post and to conduct Indian Affairs with
the surrounding tribes. The immense costs of this interior fort would eventually cause the British
to abandon it, with the commanding officer opening it up to the ravages of the Mississippi in
1772.
Fort Michilimackinac
Fort Michilimackinac was built along the Mackinac straits by French soldiers in 1715.
From there, a very vibrant fur trade with local indigenous tribes developed and further
colonization occurred over the ensuing decades. This fort became the center for the French trade
of the Great Lakes, with voyageurs and couer de bois controlling and coordinating the interior
trade and the French military maintaining their presence through this location. With the Treaty
of Paris, Michilimackinac transferred to British control, but other than a formal shift in control,
little changed for the residents and trade. The British would dismantle this fort in 1779, moving
across the strait to Mackinac Island.

A History of Site Excavations
Fort St. Joseph
Excavations at Fort St. Joseph began in 1998 and archaeological investigations have
continued there since. The Fort St. Joseph Archaeological Project, through Western Michigan
University, first sought to locate the site of the fort as well as to begin to form the context of the
artifactual remains upon the site (Nassaney, 2007:3). Over the years, investigations have focused
upon five houses likely representing fur traders, and excavations have occurred over roughly
twenty-five percent of the site’s area, although Dr. Michael Nassaney, who has led this project,
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comments that the site’s boundaries are unknown, and may rest beneath a twentieth century
dump (Nassaney, personal communication, 11/28/2016). Contemporary documents suggest that
at peak population, perhaps another 15-20 buildings existed within this area.
Over the course of these excavations, only one study utilized the 120 gunflints found on
site, dating through the 2009 season. Carvalhaes’s (2011) analysis of this assemblage represents
the sole systematic work done on these artifacts. No further analysis has been done on this type
of artifacts recovered since 2009 (Carvalhaes, 2011), nor have any other reports appeared
detailing gunflints at the fort, although excavations have continued each summer since 2009.
Carvalhaes’s study, while thorough and academic, is an honors thesis, and some conclusions
ascribing flint sizes, nation of origin, and end use are tenuously based, as will be discussed.

Figure 6: Excavation Map of Fort St. Joseph
(Nassaney, 2007:8)

Fort St. Joseph, because of its location, was linked intimately to Fort Michilimackinac.
These contemporaneous forts served different purposes, but were similarly supplied, so much so
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that Fort Michilimackinac would serve as the distribution center for the trade and military goods
sent into the interior of the French colony. Fort St. Joseph, as stated previously, existed in the
capacity of a local commercial center. It existed to link the local indigenous population through
trade and alliance to the French in Michilimackinac, and ultimately, New France. Carvalhaes
(2011:38) concludes that, as a result, their gunflints would come from the same source. In this
same analysis, and given the relatively small garrison of twenty soldiers at the fort, linking the
gunflints by their size to the style of firearms they were intended to spark also proved possible.
Serving the French goals of commerce and alliance, trade guns (and their corresponding
gunflints) would dominate this assemblage, and the French also provided a blacksmith to help
repair native guns (Nassaney et al. 2007). With only a limited British presence there, from 17611763, when Pontiac wiped out its garrison of ten soldiers and imprisoned three other English
who resided there, the fort would see only limited British trade or military goods. Given the
logistic difficulties of transporting good to the fort from Fort Pitt, at the confluence of the
Allegheny and Monongahela Rivers in modern-day Pittsburgh, or up the Ohio River from Fort
de Chartres, the most likely place of resupply for the British would have been Fort
Michilimackinac, which saw stockpiles of French-manufactured goods. In fact, the Commander
of British forces in North America commented as late as 1770 that the “Pouteatamies [sic.] at S t
Joseph, a Licentious People who have done Mischief; but they always receive their Supplys from
Canada” (Carter, 1931:279). Even when the British overtook this fortification, they continued to
supply it, however briefly, from Michilimackinac. The indigenous and French populations
surrounding the fort, however, sought cheaper, and better quality, by their perception, goods
from French traders coming down from this same area. The French dominance of this fort, then,
should find reflection in the gunflint assemblage.
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Fort Ouiatenon
Archaeological excavation at Fort Ouiatenon began in 1968 and would continue for
eleven years. The original goal was to locate the stockade and original blockhouse of the fort.
Subsequent investigations have focused upon the indigenous villages located outside of the fort’s
walls. Excavations occurring between 1974 and 1979 yielded 612 gunflints. Dr. Vergil Noble
examined these, classifying them by mode of manufacture and color. A dissertation by Judith
Tordoff (1983) examined a smaller number of these as well, using Lyle Stone’s classification
system of the artifacts from Michilimackinac. No recent analysis has occurred on these
gunflints, nor any published material on more recent excavations performed in the indigenous
villages which surrounded the fort. No master map of excavation currently exists of Fort
Ouiatenon.
Fort Ouiatenon, like Fort St. Joseph, rested within the Michilimackinac trade and supply
network. Ouiatenon sat at an interesting geographical position between New France (Canada)
and the Louisiana colony, with goods flowing both ways along the rivers and trade paths. The
assemblages, then, remain fairly similar, although serving different purposes. Founded in 1717
by the French as a way to stymie British incursions into the areas south of the Great Lakes, this
fort would see seventy-five years of occupation, but settlements similar to Fort St. Joseph. While
a civilian trading and farming population would grow up at the fort, and indigenous populations
would come to engage in trade, the French and British military presences would remain small.
In 1748, the French planned for an estimated garrison of ten soldiers during times of peace, with
twenty during war (Tordoff, 1983:49). With the British takeover of Ouiatenon in 1761, a
garrison of fifteen would command the area, at least until Pontiac’s war two years later, when the
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fort would surrender. While the British would retake the fort, they would never regarrison it
(Noble, 1991:67).

Fort Michilimackinac
Fort Michilimackinac existed as an extension of French control into the interior of New
France from 1715 until 1760. The French located the fort, at least nominally, in a strategic
location to control the Indian trade and in an attempt to stymie British advances and influences
into their territories (Tordoff, 1983; 28). As only one in a chain of fortifications from Montreal
to Quebec to the western reaches of New France, Michilimackinac served as a supply depot to
smaller posts like Ouiatenon and St. Joseph, but perhaps more importantly as a fortified trading
post. In the first decades of its existence, the fort may have held thirty-five soldiers and officers,
but also their families, traders, craftsmen, missionaries, and those who traded with the natives,
the coureurs-de-bois and voyageurs. By the mid-eighteenth century, as imperial wars grew
larger, British colonial influence threatened, and colonial corners grew, the garrison at
Michilimackinac numbered twenty soldiers in times of peace, 150 during times of war, but with
ten families living within the fort year round and 200 voyageurs and traders intermittently
inhabiting the fort (Tordoff, 1983:49; Nassaney, et.al., 2007:6).
The British took control of this fortification in 1760, after the French and Indian War, and
would continue in their attempts at asserting their control over the former French colonists, their
indigenous allies, and trade networks, until 1780, when they razed the fort and relocated on
Mackinac Island (Stone, 1972:45). With similar number of traders at the fort, the British troops
would increase over the duration of the British tenure. In 1763, General Gage would reorganize
the troops in North America, sending two companies, approximately ten officers and forty-seven
soldiers per company, to man Fort Michilimackinac (Alvord and Carter, 1916:551).
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Michilimackinac’s civilian population would only continue to increase. Of note, and impacting
archaeological interpretations at this site, in the Articles of Capitulation which surrendered this
fort to the British in 1763, the French civilians within still “owned most of the houses and land
within the palisade” (Evans, 2013:227). British military and civilians cohabitated with French
Canadian civilians daily during the British tenure of this fortification.

Figure 7: Master Excavation Map of Fort Michilimackinac (Courtesy of Mackinac State Historic
Parks)

Continuous excavation of Fort Michilimackinac has occurred since 1959. In the most
comprehensive of these studies, Lyle Stone (1974) recorded 2,536 gunflints recorded between
1959 and 1966. Of these, he classified 2,183 as wedge/spall gunflints, 248 as blades, and 5 as
“blade-spalls” through an examination of color and technique of manufacture (Stone, 1974:247).
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Later analysis by Hamilton and Emery sought to reclassify these artifacts through an analysis of
the composition of the stone comprising the artifact itself. They noted, as well, that gunspalls,
when weighed, totaled 25.8 pounds with French flakes at 3.7 pounds, further reinforcing the
differential between these weights of gunspalls by seven (1988:27). Additional excavations have
occurred at the Powder Magazine and along the Rue de la Babillarde a few years later, which
have yielded additional gunflints, but Stone, obviously, did not include these numbers within his
work and no cumulative work has been issued (Heldman and Minnerly, 1977; Heldman and
Grange, 1981).
In the powder magazine excavation, for example, researchers discovered a small, broken
keg which contained gunflints, providing a preserved context of the British-abandoned and
subsequently burned structure. These gunflints remain as discovered, unanalyzed but available
for observation at the fort. While heat altered the colors of the stones to a dull gray, reducing
analysts ability to assign a color to the gunflints, Hamilton and Emery classify their basic form as
English due to their lack of a rounded heel, yet rounded edges, and the presence of little to no
retouching, or nibbling, along the edges. All appear to represent gunspalls, with no French
flakes present. Lastly, they qualify these particular gunflints as most likely military fowler in
size, although no measurements have been recorded directly (1988:173).
Within the context of the Rue de Babillarde, Heldman and Grange recorded evidence of
both spall and blade gunflints. British and French gunspalls totaled ninety one, with French
blades amounting to thirty-six. They further note a decrease in frequency of gunspalls in
associated contexts over time, as the French blade appeared at Michilimackinac (Heldman and
Grange, 1981:165). Within this excavation area, Heldman and Grange had access to early
British occupation deposits, as well as with specific 1760s refuse pits in other areas of the
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fortification that they could link to the British, helping to secure the context of some of these
gunflints to a likely association with their use. Both spall and blades were discovered, in
particular, behind “House F,” and likely linked to British occupation (1981:107, 299). With the
adoption of military standards for size, the adoption of the French lock as standard equipment,
and overall increased standardization of parts and equipment within the French military, this
decrease would fit the overall trend.

Fort de Chartres
The French completed enough construction of the third incarnation of Fort de Chartres by
1756 to allow inhabitation by French troops. Taking advantage of the local resources, this stone
fortification, built in the Vauban style, continued the French plans for trade, alliance, and empire
in the way that Michilimackinac and the other forts had done, but Keene (1991:29) asserts that
“French intentions in the midcontinent were more sophisticated and economic activity more
diversified than previously thought”. Unlike French activities at Michilimackinac, which served
essentially as a trading depot, Keene suggests that in the Illinois Country, French activities
focused, instead, upon agricultural pursuits, as well as trade, for shipment down the Mississippi
to New Orleans. As a result, the fort itself, and its inhabitants were composed differently than at
other forts. While the 1752 census of the Illinois Country showed 151 soldiers, and three
hundred soldiers later came to construct the fort (Keene, 1991:38, 20), only a few officers and
forty soldiers inhabited the fort in 1765, when it was surrendered to the British (Alvord and
Carter, 1916:106).
The British, on the other hand, needed large numbers of soldiers at this distant place in
order to maintain the peace of the former French colony, but also to show strength in the
presence of large number of indigenous peoples who lived near the fort. This is especially true
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with the conclusion of Pontiac’s War just the year prior. With one hundred men, Captain Stirling
took control of the fort in October of 1765 (Alvord and Carter, 1916:105), and this number
would fairly quickly swell to 171 proposed troops in 1767 and 227 in mid-1768 (Alvord and
Carter, 1916:551; 1921:287). Under the British, only a few licensed traders were allowed to
reside within or near the fort’s walls, and other than families of the soldiers, no one else lived
within the structure, contrary to what occurred regularly at Michilimackinac. French civilians,
unlike at the other forts examined in this study, lived outside the fort’s walls (Keene, 2013:233).

Figure 8: Excavation Map of Fort de Chartres (courtesy of Dr. David Keene)
(Keene, 2002:82)
The current site of Fort de Chartres is approximately 6 acres in size (Keene, 1991: 95).
Excavations began in the early 1970s, and subsequent investigations have focused, essentially,
43

on gaining information for historical reconstruction efforts. To date, no systematic analysis of
the gunflints from the Fort de Chartres assemblage has been performed. Site reports for some of
the excavation seasons yield scant evidence and have apparently only classified gunflints by
color and ‘model’ (spall/blade). Keene’s research (2002) noted fifty-three gunflints from the
various seasons of excavation at Fort de Chartres, and commented that only five of the fifty-three
gunflints belonged to the blade category, with the rest fitting into the gunspall category. He also
noted that he only considered materials found in French contexts, as that was the focus of his
work. As part of this thesis, this author has obtained the gunflints from previous assemblages,
and the heretofore unstudied Thurman (1980) excavation, in an attempt to provide such a
systematic analysis.
Further complicating the collection from Fort de Chartres is the context and later
documentation of the artifacts. In the 1974 excavation, for example, Brown noted the difficulty
of assigning materials to context to the post-occupation disturbances within the fort. Most of the
artifacts found during this first formal excavation came from general fill, and assigning cultural
significance to particular strata proved tenuous as a result (Brown, 1976:31). The parade ground,
a little less than two acres, when tested demonstrated no undamaged archaeological deposits.
Keene noted that “It is unclear if this is due to the fact that the area may have been scraped in the
nineteenth or early twentieth century or whether very little activity” took place within that area
(Keene, 2002:146). In the subsequent year, Orser noted that particular features clearly
demonstrated post-1772 [the date of the fort’s formal destruction by the British] intrusions in the
subsoil and that most artifacts were relocated as secondary deposits. Still, Orser believed that
two particular features, numbers 39 and 40, could be related to the British occupation of the fort
due to associated artifacts and a possible documented blacksmith shop attributed to the British.
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In these features, grey gunspall style gunflints were excavated (Orser, 1977:107-108, 128).
Orser further notes that, given the history of the fort, eight separate cultural horizons should
exist, demonstrating the separate natural and cultural stages of its occupation (1977:139).
One difference between Fort de Chartres and a few of its contemporary companion sites
lay in the fact that historical documents exist which gave detailed information about the interior
structures of the fort, allowing archaeologists to attempt to provide some context for the artifacts
found within those areas. Nine structures existed within the fort, some with deep cellars, but
these “appear to have been cleaned out decades prior to systematic excavations. Testing in these
cellars failed to reveal any intact archaeological deposits” (Keene, 2002:144). This allowed the
excavations of the 1970s, which focused on recreation of the buildings, to examine areas such as
the barracks buildings, powder magazine, and bake house.
Further complicating the archaeological history of Fort de Chartres is its geography. It
sits astride the Mississippi River threatened with flooding since its inception, as it still does
today. In fact, General Thomas Gage ordered the razing of Fort de Chartres in 1772, destroying
it “in such a Manner…that he removed the stones which protected the Banks of the River and
opened Drains to admit the Water, so that the Floods in the Fall will entirely wash away the
Front of the Fort” (Gage to Hillsborough, 2 Sept., 1771 in Carter, 1931:332). Subsequent
flooding, the stripping away of stones from the fort by locals, tree growth throughout, and
farming of the land meant that by 1900, only the powder magazine, in a dilapidated state,
remained of the fort.
Lastly, investigations concluded with two other attempts at excavating parts of Fort de
Chartres, in 1979-1981 and 1985-1987. The first of these, under Melburn Thurman, sought to
establish a more formal and systematic mapping and plan of the earlier excavations seasons, but
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the vast majority of information and data collected from these seasons, including field notes,
were destroyed in a house fire. All that exists of these seasons is a very preliminary report filed
with the Illinois Department of Conservation which contains no analysis or description of
materials and the seven boxes of artifacts housed in the Illinois State Museum collections, and
which, prior to this thesis, had no received any further analysis. The 1985-1987 season,
conducted by David Keene, sought to examine a number of areas, particularly the walls, prior to
their reconstruction in 1989. In Keene’s dissertation, a very brief examination of the gunflint
assemblage of all of the excavation seasons was undertaken by simply classifying the fifty-three
gunflints into blades or gunspalls. Keene does not mention any examination of the Thurman
assemblage. Keene considered five as qualifying as blades, with one of those of British
manufacture (Keene, 2002:156). No descriptions of shape, morphological characteristics, or any
other diagnostic markers were discussed.
In this analysis of the gunflints of Fort de Chartres, all of the gunflints previously listed in
site reports from the Brown, Orser, Thurman, and Keene excavations have been examined,
measured, and recorded. Gunflints have also been scanned and uploaded online on kobotoolbox,
with the address listed in this paper’s conclusions. The Illinois State Museum has loaned twelve
gunflints to the Fort de Chartres Museum. These gunflints have not been made available for
examination in any way over the course of this thesis research and cannot be included in this
study, regrettably. As a result, a total of thirty gunflints, of the original forty-three artifacts
designated as gunflints, remained accessible for analysis for this study. Of those, five lithic
artifacts were studied and deemed not to be gunflints, or appeared so damaged that a reasonable
designation of artifact class [spall, blade/English or French] could not be assigned. One of the
first items to note about this assemblage from Fort de Chartres lay in the relative lack of
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gunflints recovered from excavations. While Michilimackinac’s gunflint count numbered over
2,000, and Ouiatenon’s collection numbered over 640, even St. Joseph’s tally reached 120. At
Fort de Chartres, this tally only reached thirty-five [plus twelve unavailable for study]. These
tallies might suggest a difference in availability of supply, or more likely, the smaller scales of
excavation performed at this site as opposed to the other three.

47

CHAPTER IV: DATA AND ANALYSIS
These four fortifications have not had comparative archaeological investigative
experiences. Only Fort Michilimackinac has seen extensive, continuous excavation at the one
extreme, with Fort de Chartres undergoing only a few, sporadic seasons decades ago that
examined only a comparatively small area of the site. As a result, sample sizes between these
four assemblages vary dramatically and may have an impact upon the interpretation of gunflint
data. On the other hand, British and French habitation of these locations have also varied, again
with Michilimackinac at the longest and most thorough extreme, but this time with Fort
Ouiatenon on the short end. This, too, needs to be factored into, or at least discussed, in any
interpretation. What follows is a systematic exploration of the various seasons of archaeological
investigation and degrees of that excavation on the four target sites. An inquiry into the
morphological characteristics of the gunflints assemblages as well as the probable lithic
characteristics is also presented in an attempt to ascertain likely supply and usage patterns.
Finally, this section will examine other factors which may have impacted the supply or choice of
particular gunflints at these interior fortifications such as sparking qualities, durability, politicaleconomic influences, and symbolic choices.

Sites and Their Assemblages
Fort de Chartres
As previously stated, no systematic analysis of the gunflints from the Fort de Chartres
assemblage has been performed to date. Keene’s research (2002) only classified gunflints by
color and ‘model’ (spall/blade). This study noted fifty-three gunflints from the various seasons
of excavation at Fort de Chartres, and commented that only five of the fifty-three gunflints
belonged to the blade classification, with the rest fitting into the gunspall classification. Keene

48

also noted that he only considered materials found in French contexts, as that was the focus of
his work. Granted, Keene’s focus was to examine all of the artifacts found in previous efforts,
and to classify them, but this brief examination of the gunflint assemblage does not mention any
descriptions of shape, morphological characteristics, or any other diagnostic markers. As part of
this thesis, I have obtained the gunflints from previous assemblages, and the heretofore unstudied
Thurman (1980) excavation, in an attempt to provide such a systematic analysis. By providing
the metrics for the gunflints, a more apt investigation, and comparative study, can be
accomplished.
In the present analysis, again, all of the gunflints previously listed in site reports
excavations have been examined, measured, and recorded. A total of thirty gunflints, of the
original forty-three artifacts designated as gunflints were utilized in this analysis. Five lithic
artifacts were studied and deemed not to be gunflints, or were so damaged that this designation
could not be assigned. The damage appeared to result from reuse, and significant chipping and
gouges had resulted in the removal of any diagnostic characteristics. One of the first items to
note about this gunflint assemblage of Fort de Chartres is the relative lack of gunflints recovered
from excavations. While Michilimackinac’s numbered over 2,000, Ouiatenon’s collection
numbered over 640, and even St. Joseph’s tally reached 120, this fort tallied only thirty-five [plus
twelve unavailable for study]. This relatively low number may result, in part, from there only
having been four seasons of excavation on site, and those excavations’ focus upon areas meant
for historical reconstruction. Only a small percentage of Fort de Chartres has been excavated. It
may also result from the scarcity of gunflints at the site in general, due to original supply issues
or that the British military stripped the fort of everything useful before razing it.
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50

Figure 9: Fort de Chartres British Gunspalls (1 cm scale)

Figure 10: Fort de Chartres French Gunspalls (1 cm scale)

With five blades recovered, and given the chronology of Fort de Chartres, only four were
examined and recorded as of French manufacture. Keene also classified one of these blades
resulting from British manufacture (2002:156), but given that the British did not begin crafting
blades until late into the American Revolution, it was either deposited there long after the British
had abandoned the fort, or is a later intrusion, possibly from one of the many shooting
reenactments which occur at the fort regularly. Of the four remaining French blades, two were
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fragments, with lengths (edge to heel) recorded for two. Still, as representatives, they match
similar styles found at the other forts. With the fort’s completion not happening until almost 15
years after the standardized measurements for military gunflints found in Emy’s 1740 contract
(Hamilton and Emery, 1988:14) showing a heel to edge length of 31.6-33.8 mm, a side to side
width of 33.8-36.0 mm, and a thickness ranging from 9.0-11.8 mm, these blades clearly do not fit
within those specifications. If we use Hamilton and Emery’s ranges for other types of firearms,
all four fall within the trade gun range. Hamilton and Emery consider trade guns as muskets
meant for exchange or sale with the local indigenous population, smaller than military muskets
or civilian fowlers in terms of calibers. Trade guns typically had blade flints from 20-28mm in
side to side width (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:21). The four blades in this collection fit within
19.97-22.28 mm. Even with Emy’s 1740 contract, which specified a standardized size, modern
researchers have suggested that these standards simply were not met. David Williams and David
Harding, for example, are adamant that the British East India Company and British flint
manufactures found it almost impossible to standardize flint sizes to any significant degree
(personal communication, 2/1/2017; D.F. Harding, 1997). Given the role of Fort de Chartres not
only as a military site, but as a major trading station which also attempted to solidify alliance
with a substantial number of surrounding indigenous nations, the role of trade goods, like
firearms and accoutrements, should not be undervalued.
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Figure 11: Fort de Chartres French Blades (1 cm scale)
Using the style of manufacture, with characteristics such as the “D-form” of the heel,
large flake scars on the heel, or significant nibbling along the edges, the author separated the
thirty-one gunspalls into a likely nation of affiliation based on these characteristics (Hamilton
and Emery, 1988:13, 159; Kenmotsu 1990:98; Smith, 1961:422). Twenty-four of the gunspalls
most likely represent artifacts of French manufacture and seven of British. The French gunspalls
ranged from 18.8 to 36.93 mm in length, with a mean of 29.81 and a median length of 29.51 mm.
Their width ranged from 15.09-29.11 mm, with a mean of 22.64 and a median width of 22.46
mm. The British gunspalls measured larger in both length and width, with the heel to edge
distance ranging from 25.08 to 36.2 mm, and a 29.25 mean, 27.9 mm median. Widths, similarly
measured more than the French gunspalls. The width of British gunspalls ranged from 20.6 to
33.76 mm, with a mean of 25.67, and a median side to side measurement of 24.05 mm.
Essentially, then, British gunspalls at this site demonstrated a likelihood to be both larger and
wider, statistically, than the French gunspalls. Granted, the Fort de Chartres sample, at this time,
remains fairly small, with less than forty-five total gunflints and only seven British gunflints, but
even so, these size differences, when compared to those of the other three fortifications, is of
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note. Granted, with a larger sample/more excavation, it would be interesting to see if this trend
continued, and supported the possibility of a different potential source maker or supplier for
these particular gunspalls at Fort de Chartres, most likely due to the differences in traders
responsible for supplying this interior fort.

Fort St. Joseph
The scientific excavation of Fort St. Joseph began in 1998 and archaeological collections
have continued there essentially every year since. Over the course of these excavations, only one
study utilized the 120 gunflints found on site, dating through the 2009 season. Carvalhaes’ 2011
analysis of this assemblage represents the sole systematic work done on these artifacts. No
further analysis has been done on this type of artifacts recovered since 2009 (Carvalhaes, 2011),
nor have any other reports appeared delineating gunflints at the fort since, although excavations
have continued each summer since 2009.
With the 120 gunflints excavated and analyzed, Carvalhaes classifies them as mostly
gunspalls, totaling 109, while eleven represented blade technology and one locally made,
representing an unreported, different style. These spalls matched the variety and colors of spalls
thought to reflect the French supplies found at Fort Michilimackinac, and Carvalhaes designates
ninety-two as French, noting that their “colors range from a light olive brown (2.5Y5/3) to dark
grayish brown (2.5Y4/2).” Carvalhaes notes the homogeneity of these artifacts in terms of color
and composite stone, as well as intrusions and shapes, with “carefully worked heels into a
rounded “D” shape” (Carvalhaes, 2011:26). The D-shape and uniformity of stone, due to the
mining of specific quarries, rather than the haphazard surface collection more typical of British
spalls, indeed is representative of the stereotypical French spall. The French craft industry, while
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still a craft industry, demonstrated a much more standardized, systematic, and organized
approach to the fashioning of gunflints than did the British.

Figure 12: Fort St. Joseph French Gunspalls
(Carvalhaes, 2011:27)

Deviating from the concept of manufacturing techniques/shape, where the English style
of gunspall has less work, and a more squarish heel, Carvalhaes instead designates the gunflints
thought to represent English styles, based essentially on the color, which ranged “from gray to
black with many mottled ones and look as though they come from various sources of flint.”
While the English did, in fact, utilize much more variety in flint sources, the difficulty with this
type of separation, arises from the fact that both nations utilized similar stones, and neither had
colors unique to one particular nation. Both France and Britain have outcroppings of black, grey,
and other colored stones. As Durst stated, merely visually-definitive assignation of black style
spalls to manufacturing in Britain or France remains impossible at this time. “The spall-type
gunflints manufactured in England did not utilize the Brandon source for flint and are thus not
easily distinguishable from their French counterparts. Any assignment to a geological source of
spall-type gunflints remains purely speculative at this point” (email to author, April 13,
2016). Careful observation of the heels of gunspalls in particular must be made to differentiate
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between those likely to originate in France or England. Based on the technique of manufacture,
and the shape of the heel, only ten gunflints (all spalls) most likely represent gunflints of English
origin. Given the English style of nodule collection, and similar representatives in the Fort
Michilimackinac collection, the heterogeneous nature of this stone is not atypical (Carvalhaes,
2011:27). Additionally, in terms of later supply, the British would continue to send supplies, like
gunflints, to this fort from Michilimackinac, and not down the Ohio from Fort Pitt. Thus, the
collection would continue to retain gunflints more representative of this French style of gunspall,
as the British utilized stores remaining and bought from French traders residing within Fort
Michilimackinac. Potentially, the few British soldiers garrisoned within this fort could have
fashioned their own gunflints from local supplies or French stores, but little evidence exists to
suggest these “chip” or “do it yourself” style of gunflints existed within these assemblages.
With the bulk of supply coming from upper Michigan, and only a very limited British
presence, this type of assemblage seems illustrative and deviates little from larger examples like
Michilimackinac. On a related note, the assemblage from St. Joseph denotes differences in the
raw materials used in the designated French spalls and blades. “The source of raw material for
these French spalls has yet to be found. It is not the same as what French blade gunflints were
made” (Carvalhaes, 2011:43). Carvalhaes bases this conclusion upon the comparison to the
Michilimackinac collection as well as other sites such as the Trudeau site in Louisiana, and an
Osage site in Missouri. Assuming that the initial designation of Michilimackinac spalls as
“French” remains accurate; Carvalhaes concludes that similar spalls at St. Joseph also represent
French manufacture.
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Figure 13: Fort St. Joseph British Gunspalls
(Carvalhaes, 2011:28)

Only eleven of the 120 gunflints fit the category of blade gunflints. Based, again, on
comparison to the Michilimackinac collection, Carvalhaes reasserts that French blades find their
composition from “a yellowish glossy translucent flint,” and when measured, have widths greater
to their lengths. The British did not begin blade manufacturing until around the time of the
American Revolution, and most likely did not export them into the American colonies until very
late in that conflict, if not until after. As a result, no British-made blades should exist within this
assemblage, as it was evacuated a decade before this time. Similarly, none of the eleven blades
represent the stereotypical black “glossless” flint associated with Brandon-made British blades
(Carvalhaes, 2011:26). Simply, the lack of British blade, or flake, style gunflints does not come
as a surprise. They should not be there unless deposited at a later time. Additionally, with no
other connections of British blade manufacturing sources beyond Brandon, and its fairly uniform
flint, conclusive links to other types of flint simply cannot be made at this time.
When examining the physical dimensions of the artifacts, the St. Joseph assemblage
continues to represent both British and French patterns for gunflints. Utilizing manufacturing
style and color for separation, the gunflints represent similar samples found at Michilimackinac,
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but when looking at other characteristics, some differences arise. Very few (six) of the blade
gunflints met the minimum size for French military muskets (34 mm) as delineated by Emy’s
study of a contract of 1740 military muskets (1975), with the remaining representing those
muskets intended for the indigenous market or civilian guns. This is assuming that the contract
referred to blade-style gunflints, which is not discussed within the original contract. Subsequent
writers (Hamilton and Emery, 1988) and Carvalhaes appear to apply the contract to all manner of
gunflints, whether blade of spall. This, however, seems unlikely, especially as the French had
already begun the switch over to blade style gunflints by the late 17 th century, and had
standardized their use with the invention of the French lock at least twenty years before Emy’s
classification system, particularly within their military.
Carvalhaes lists the mean width for blade gunflints at 26.4 mm, with a median of 28 mm.
Mean length falls at 20.6 mm with a median of 21.1 mm. Thickness, or height, of the blades has
a median of 7.5 mm with a mean of 7.9 mm (Carvalhaes, 2011:30). Gunspalls measured greater
in all categories, with a median width of 27.3 mm and a mean width of 27.2 mm. Gunspall
length had a median length of 23.1 mm and a mean length of 23.0. Carvalhaes does not list a
mean and median for the thickness of gunspalls, but instead lists a range from 5.0 mm to 8.9 mm
with “few outliers” (2011:29). No distinction for the measurements of those gunspalls
designated “French” or “English” forms, based on the methods of manufacturing, is listed in the
contained tables, making it difficult to ascertain any difference in widths, thicknesses, or lengths
of French or British-designated gunspalls.
With these measurements taken, Carvalhaes then utilizes Emy’s study of a contract of
1740 military muskets (1975) to organize all of the gunflints into categories based on their
average size. With this, Carvalhaes then classifies 56% of the gunflints as trade guns, based on
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the average size, and 38% as fowlers and carbines. None of the flints designated as English
flints would fit a military musket based on their size (Carvalhaes, 2011:41). Granted, almost any
‘size’ flint would fit a military musket, but over-large flints, or too small flints have the potential
to affect the firing and sparking efficiency of the lock. Further mimicking established norms of
gunspall differences, especially when compared to those at Fort Michilimackinac, the gunspalls
classified as French measured larger and of a more standardized proportion than did the English
gunspalls. The problem with this classification, however, again rests upon the fact that Emy’s
1740 study does not offer any distinction as to whether this standard measurement referred to
gunspalls or blades. As such, the 1740 contract most likely gives the best-case measurements for
blade style gunflints in France, and Carvalhaes’ attempt to apply it to gunspalls may be dubious
at best. While size, in terms of width and length, may matter in particular styles of firearms,
yielding more or fewer sparks, the evidence isn’t in the literature to suggest that blades and spalls
could be uniformly exchanged in this manner, or that the British and French soldiers, civilians,
and traders were all that aware of the likely impact of size differences. In fact, gunspalls, on the
whole, tend to have dimensions both longer and wider than blades.

59

Figure 14: Fort St. Joseph French Gunspalls Showing Reuse Wear.
(Gunspall on left shows reuse with fire steel. Carvalhaes, 2011:35)

With many used gunflints finding a new life with fire-steels throughout the colonial
world, the St. Joseph gunflints proved no exception to this. The Fort St. Joseph gunflints were
also subjected to examination for signs of wear and reuse. The majority of the artifacts
demonstrated use wear, with many showing the heavy wear resulting from striking fire-steels.
Use wear also exists on multiple edges of the gunflint, denoting the tendency to retouch and turn
gunflints in the flintlock cock in order to provide continued sparking capability. Carvalhaes
describes thirty-eight gunflints possessing retouched edges, with twelve having two worked
edges. Twenty-two of these evidenced three retouched edges, and three had all four reworked.
Based on an observation of “diagnostic bi-facial step-flaking and concave fracturing,” and a
much heavier degree of minute flake removal, these gunflints show that they most likely had
been used with fire-steels (Carvalhaes, 2011:34, 19). Sixty percent of the English gunspalls
demonstrated three or four working edges, evidenced by this bifacial step-flaking. Carvalhaes
bases the discussion and criteria on reworked gunflints vs. those reused as fire steels largely upon
criteria set up by Kenmotsu (1990). Given the logistics of supplying the fort during the brief
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British tenure, and life upon the frontier, individuals would constantly see the need to rework
their gunflints to prolong their usefulness. In terms of the location of these gunflints, “with the
exception of two refuse pits, gunflints are relatively evenly scattered across the site” (Carvalhaes,
2011:37). It is difficult, then, to assign particular gunflints, whether designated English or
French, to specific activity areas, or discard areas, at Fort St. Joseph.

Fort Ouiatenon
The various excavations that occurred during the 1970s yielded 612 gunflints. Dr. Vergil
Noble examined these, classifying them by mode of manufacture and color. A dissertation by
Judith Tordoff (1983) examined the same collection, but reported a smaller number of artifacts.
Tordoff used Lyle Stone’s classification system of the gunflints from Michilimackinac. No
recent analysis has occurred on these gunflints, nor any published material on more recent
excavations performed in the indigenous villages which surrounded the fort. Discrepancies exist
between Noble’s calculations and classifications and Tordoff’s, with no explanation given.
These can be observed in the following two tables, which outline the numbers of gunflints
reported vs. measured, and the size differences. Fort Ouiatenon, like Fort St. Joseph, rested
within the Michilimackinac trade and supply network. The artifactual record, then, remains
fairly representative of New France, demonstrating this site’s role as a fur trade station and its
role in maintaining alliances with the indigenous populations.
The gunflints distribution at Ouiatenon centered around three principle locations, the
forging area, a basement (possibly to a row house), and a subterranean storehouse. The
storehouse, in particular, yielded forty-three unused gunflints from a cache pit. In the vast
majority of these locations, Tordoff associates the gunflints with other artifacts designated
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French, or to a French designed/utilized activity period (Tordoff, 1983:167). British assignations
of gunflints remain dubious for Tordoff, and only are suggested as possibilities when
connections to particular area are in doubt, or can’t conclusively be determined. A paucity in the
availability of written documents, as they relate to the supply of Fort Ouiatenon, hampers further
clear discussion of just which goods were brought into this trading post/fortification.
Of the slightly over six hundred gunflints excavated from Ouiatenon, Noble and Tordoff
classified 498 of them as spall type gunflints and 114 blade type gunflints using Stone’s
classification system from Fort Michilimackinac. According to Noble, “only blade gunflints
(those struck from a prepared core) and spall gunflints (those exhibiting a bulb of percussion on
the superior surface) are recognized . . . [and] Measurements, again following Tordoff’s
precedent, are recorded only for complete specimens” (Noble, 1983:196). Using Stone’s system,
Tordoff and Noble modify the classifications to incorporate a Series/Type description and a color
designation. These categories include descriptions of the extent of beveling of the edges and
back, and the extent of the face or back flake, but only for the blade type of gunflint. Spall
gunflints receive little to no description beyond “wedge shaped,” and color designations. See the
following chart for a breakdown of the measurements (no mean or median given by Noble or
Tordoff).
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Noble’s Tabulations
Taxon

# Measured/
# Listed

Length (mm)

Width
(mm)

Thickness
(mm)

SAT1 (Blade- Beveled
Edge and Back, Flat
Face, Rounded Back
Heel)
SAT2 (Blade- Beveled
Edge, Flat Face,
Rounded Back Heel,
No Back Flake)
SAT3 (Blade- Beveled
Edge and Back, No
Face Flake, Triangular
in Cross Section)

11/114 (but
only lists 21)

15.8-25.2

20.7-32.5

4.8-8.7

20/41

14.2-32.1

18.3-35.8

4.2-11.2

10/17

15.7-26.7

24.0-31.5

4.6-8.9

SAT4 (Blade- Long
Flat Face, Rounded
Back)
SCT1 (Spall)

7/7

19.0-32.7

23.2-40.8

4.3-7.7

123/498

17.0-32.7

19.9-38.7

4.0-12.7

Table 3: Fort Ouiatenon Gunflint Metrics
(Nobel, 1983:206)
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Tordoff’s Measurements
Taxon
#
Length Mean/ Width
Mean/ Thickness
Measured (mm)
Median (mm)
Median (mm)
/# Listed
SAT1
5/6
20.5-27 23.5/23 24.027.75/2 5.25-8.7
(Blade.7
32.4
8.2
Beveled
Edge and
Back, Flat
Face,
Rounded
Back Heel)
SAT2
9/18
16.923.63/2 22.426.89/2 4.4-11.8
(Blade29.0
3.1
33.9
6.4
Beveled
Edge, Flat
Face,
Rounded
Back Heel,
No Back
Flake)
SAT3
5/86
17.320.46/2 19.325.16/2 4.3-8.1
(Blade22.3
1.1
27.7
5.6
Beveled
Edge and
Back, No
Face Flake,
Triangular
in Cross
Section)
SAT4
0/2
(BladeLong Flat
Face,
Rounded
Back)
SCT1
111/293
16.723.70/2 18.927.73/2 3.4-10.7
(Spall)
33.8
3.3
39.4
7.6
Table 4: Fort Ouiatenon Gunflint Metrics
(Tordoff, 1983:311-319) [Means and Medians, my calculations]

Mean/
Median
7.01/6.
98

6.13/5.
2

6.62/6.
7

-

6.86/6.
8

Tordoff’s conclusions of national manufacture for these gunflints rest on the idea that
“many of the flints sent to Ouiatenon came through Michilimackinac as part of major supply
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shipments,” thus demonstrating that the assemblages should reflect one another (Tordoff,
1983:319). This certainly seems likely for the French time at the site, and nothing in the British
documents suggest otherwise. This is especially true for the difficulty of the British to supply
the inhabitants from Fort Pitt, once again, and the reliance on either local French traders or those
sent down from Michigan as more likely suppliers. Spall gunflints at Fort Ouiatenon, as at Fort
Michilimackinac, were found in much greater frequency than blade gunflints. The ratio of blade
to spall flints at Ouiatenon is 1:6.98; at Michilimackinac it is 1:6.25 (Stone 1974b:263). As stated
previously in the discussion of Fort St. Joseph, given that spall gunflints saw use for a number of
decades before blade gunflints became the standard for France, the ratio is consistent, as spall
use was prevalent much longer than blade. Blades of British manufacture, like at Fort St. Joseph,
post-date the British occupation of this fortification.
Neither Noble nor Tordoff attempted to assign a national affiliation for the manufacturing
style of these gunflints. While categories are created, based on characteristics of manufacture,
all gunspalls appear equal to them, with no allocation of national creation based upon these
characteristics, like rounded backs, D-forms, or an absence of large flake scars to demonstrate
potential British or French manufacture. Color categories have been assigned to both blades and
spalls, classifying them with these broad-sweeping categories. Blades, for example come in four
basic colors: honey, tan, gray, and black. Upon tabulation of these assigned designations,
gunspalls essentially fall into one of two categories, with roughly half “gray-black” and the other
half “honey-tan.” A small number are listed as “rosey” or “tan-grey” (Noble, 1983:196-206).
No mention of translucence, finish, inclusions, or the like add to the descriptions of these
gunflints. Given the supply chain for both Britain and France, these colors seems likely, and
fairly typical, as those of “French” designation, based on the general colors typically assigned

65

them at places like Michilimackinac and in other contemporary assemblages. If national affinity
is to be analyzed and ascribed, these flints need reexamination, colors need refining through
utilization with the Munsell chart, and the particular shapes and degrees of retouching of the
gunspalls need analysis. Only then, perhaps, could one separate British from French gunspalls.
In an attempt to ascertain the particular use of these gunflints, Tordoff uses Emy’s study
of the 1740 French military contract and Hamilton and Emery’s 1988 discussion of Fort
Michilimackinac gunflints to compare the average lengths and widths of the French blade
gunflints. Tordoff, unlike Carvalhaes at St. Joseph, applies this examination solely to blades.
Muskets blades generally measured over 34 mm from side to side (length). Fowlers ranged from
28-34 mm. Trade guns averaged 20-28 mm from side to side (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:21).
At Ouiatenon, blades came in the following average sizes:

Classification Type
Length
Width
Thickness
Series A: Blade
23.5 mm
27.8 mm
7.0 mm
Type 1: Beveled Edge and
Back, Flat Face, Rounded
Back Heel
Series A: Blade
23.6 mm
26.9 mm
6.13 mm
Type 2: Beveled Edge,
Flat Face, Rounded Back
Heel, No
Back Flake
Series A: Blade
20.5 mm
25.2 mm
6.6 mm
Type 3: Beveled Edge
and Back, No Face Flake,
Triangular in
Cross Section
Series A: Blade
23.8 mm
27.9 mm
6.3 mm
Type 4: Long Flat Face,
Rounded Back
Table 5: Fort Ouiatenon Gunflint Averages (Tordoff, 1983:320).
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Color
Honey, Tan,
Gray

Honey, Tan,
Gray, Black

Honey, Tan,
Gray

Honey

Based on these averages of the blades, essentially all of these gunflints fell into the trade gun
category of firearms. Given Ouiatenon’s primary role in maintaining native alliances and trade,
this is hardly surprising. Tordoff also examines the amount of musket balls and gun parts found
at Ouiatenon, classifying ninety-seven percent of the balls as fitting into the trade gun category,
with less than two percent of the size necessary for French military muskets. Less than one
percent would fit the British Brown Bess musket. As a result, given the location and function of
Ouiatenon, it would appear that its proximity to French Michilimackinac, the difficulty of British
resupply via the Ohio river, and its purpose as a trading post with local indigenous populations,
dramatically affected the quantity and types of blade gunflints found there (Tordoff, 1983:321).
Some Ouiatenon gunflints also saw reuse, primarily with fire steels or as scrapers.
Tordoff’s examination of these artifacts showed evidence “jagged side edges” on fifty-seven of
the gunspalls, with many of these evincing significant uses. (Tordoff, 1983:319) No further
description exists in this catalog of the extent and type of use wear, whether retouched, stepflake, or fractured, or if the conclusions are based solely on visual observation rather than
through microscopic analysis. Again, given the location and function of Ouiatenon, reuse of
gunflints fits into the general frontier trade and residence patterns.

Fort Michilimackinac
Given the long history of excavation at Fort Michilimackinac, and the fact that the vast
majority of the site has seen investigation, a substantial amount of gunflints have been examined,
albeit not within the past twenty-plus years. The results of Stone (1972) and Hamilton and
Emery (1988) have set the standard for most North American gunflint comparisons and
discussion. Recent excavations at Fort Michilimackinac have yet to fully document their
gunflints and discuss these results in comparison to prior research at the fort. Perhaps the best
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study of Michilimackinac’s gunflints comes from Stone’s 1972 breakdown of the
Michilimackinac artifact assemblage. Stone classified the 2,536 gunflints based on the forms, or
techniques of manufacturing, identifying them as French and Dutch, rather than Blade/Flake,
Gunspall/Wedge, or Chip, as is the case now. Blades were further divided based on shape, and
spalls on flint color (Stone, 1972:46). Measurements were taken on unused gunflints, with
averages given.
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Classification
Number Length
Width
Series, Type
Series A: Blade
50
18.3-26.1; None
Type 1: Beveled
22.85
given
edge and back; flat
average
face; rounded back
heel
Series A: Blade
94
16.4-31.8; None
Type 2: Beveled
23.54
given
edge; flat face;
average
rounded back heel;
no back flake
Series A: Blade
66
18.0-27.1; None
Type 3: Beveled
21.95
given
edge and back; no
average
face flake;
triangular in cross
section
Series A: Blade
3
23.75
None
Type 4: Long, flat
average
given
face; rounded back
Series B: Blade4
23.45
None
Spall Gunflints
average
given
Series C: Spall
2032
15.9-38.3
None
Gunflints
25.11
given
Type 1: Wedge
average
Shaped
Variety A
Series C: Spall
139
21.2-32.5; None
Gunflints
27.68
given
Type 1: Wedge
average
Shaped
Variety B
Series C: Spall
4
22.6
None
Gunflints
average
given
Type 1: Wedge
Shaped
Variety C
Table 6: Fort Michilimackinac Gunflint Metrics
(Stone, 1974:247-259)

Thickness
3.9-8.8

Color
Designation
Blond to light
grey;
“Beeswax”

3.9-11.8

None given

5.0-11.1

None given

6.2-6.4

None given

6.8-9.1

None given

4.0-10.4

Grey to Brown
(94.8%)

5.0-11.9

Dark Grey to
Black (5.2%)

5.5-8.3

Brownish Red

Based upon Michilimackinac’s founding and initial settlement in 1715 until its razing in
1780, the presence and absence of particular styles of gunflints fits with the archaeological
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record.

With its establishment by the French, gunspall technology had already supplanted chip

gunflints. Furthermore, with the presence of civilian traders within Michilimackinac, and the
relative inexpensive nature of gunflints, little need for making one’s own gunflints existed. As
French blades began to replace gunspalls in the 1730s and 1740s, the assemblage would reflect
this technological shift. Similarly, although the British had placed orders for its new blade-style
gunflints, mimicking the French ones, by the late American Revolution, none appeared at this
site by the time of its abandonment and subsequent move across the strait (Hamilton and Emery,
1988:10; Stone, 1972:49).
Upon analysis, the majority of Fort Michilimackinac gunflints represent gunspalls,
despite the French blades existing essentially throughout its existence. Blades only represented
13.7% of the total assemblage, and did not appear in features associated with dates prior to 17301740. Furthermore, Stone notes that the frequency of spalls actually increased in contexts
associated with 1730-1735, as well as British features, which regularly contained spall gunflints
(Stone, 1972: 46, 261, 263). Potentially, France’s involvement in the 1733-1738 continental War
of Polish Succession and ensuing War of Austrian Succession may have impacted their ability to
manufacture and transport supplies of gunflints to this North American interior fort.
In terms of physical characteristics, Stone’s analysis breaks spalls and flints down by
their metrics even further. Black colored spalls consistently measured approximately 2.5 mm
longer and 1.43 mm wider and generally lacked the rounded heel founded in the light grey to
brown gunspalls. Black gunspalls appeared to have less reworking along their sides as well as a
more square appearance (Stone, 1972:47). This style of manufacture, generally attributed to the
British, would fit the “variety” B of wedge/spall gunflints, and make the British style of gunflint
attribute slightly less than 5.5% of the total gunflint assemblage.
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In further regard to the sizes of these various gunflints, Hamilton and Emery compared
the sizes to known measurements to look for the intended weapon-use for these gunflints. Upon
assessing one particular box of French gunspalls, they concluded that “Flints larger than 34 mm
are definitely military, but the probabilities are that many flints in the upper ranges of the 34 to
28mm size could have served equally well in the French military locks of the period, and some
of those slightly smaller than 28mm could have been used in fowlers” (Hamilton and Emery,
1988:20). As a trading post and military outpost, Fort Michilimackinac’s stores needed to serve
a variety of weapons, from muskets (smoothbore military long arms) to fowlers (civilian
smoothbores, with smaller locks), carbines, and tradeguns. Thus, tradeguns flints ranged from
20-28 mm in width (side to side), and fowlers/carbines from 28 to 34 mm (Hamilton and Emery,
1988:21). While Hamilton and Emery cite Emy’s 1740 French military contract, for
specifications of gunflints, again, it is not known if this referred to blades or gunspalls. Still,
they utilize these measurements for all, even though spalls typically measured larger in length
and blades wider. Similarly, user preference, whether on the individual level or even based upon
French vs. British, needs further analysis. Soldiers in the field and individual gunflint craftsmen
often neglected these standards, especially during times of conflict, for the expediency of a
usable, saleable, gunflint. A larger discussion of performance, or perceived performance, within
the context of the 17th and 18th centuries, especially using the primary sources of that period,
would shed light further light upon these topics.
The question of blade vs. spall preference will be addressed in more detail later, yet the
presence of both styles at Michilimackinac, even with such a disproportionate ratio, deserves an
initial discussion. With both gunspalls and blades present at Fort Michilimackinac, Stone
examined whether this had as much to do with availability over time or, instead, preference.
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With spalls larger, but less consistent in shape and size, and despite lacking standardization, they
still saw use well into the 1750s. The introduction of blades at Michilimackinac does not appear
to have come until about 1735, and blades were both wider in size and much more standard in
size and craftsmanship. Stone questioned whether those at the fort continued to use gunspalls
from preference. A related inquiry focused upon whether blade use denoted the likelihood of a
particular style of firearm as a potential source of explanation for this particular archaeological
record (1974:255, 47). Conclusive answers are not given for either question.
Hamilton and Emery propose the preference argument, stating [without historical
sources] that “It already had been established that the British army used French flake gunflints
when they could get them, and, possibly, French spall as well,” thus contributing to the
confusion of designating end use of these French gunflints (1988:2). Comparing
Michilimackinac to several other sites of the Revolutionary era (not pre-French and Indian
War/French and Indian War, as might be more appropriate given Michilimackinac’s history), the
authors contend that British troops both used and sought out French blade/flake gunflints when
possible. “It is reasonable to assume that the British did so because they thought that the French
flakes were superior to their own spalls in field performance” (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:17).
With the adoption of the Land Pattern of the Brown Bess in 1730, perhaps the British Board of
Ordnance believed that a flat upper and lower face would allow a tighter grip for the vise,
producing a greater spark (Bailey, 1972:13). With the rounded upper face of gunspalls, the
“hump” which gunflint production creates, causes the stability of the gunflint in the vise to be
less certain. By that same token, then, one would expect a massive shift in the artifactual
assemblage of the French to reflect a similar preference in blades over spalls, and a substantial
reduction of spalls post-1740, but this is not the case. No systematic documentation of gunflint
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reuse at Michilimackinac was noted by Stone or Hamilton and Emery. Perhaps the British used
French flakes over British gunspalls simply out of expediency, because they were accessible.

Comparative Metrics
The Fort de Chartres assemblage represents only a small sample when compared to the
collections of the other forts, yet somewhat uniquely, British gunspalls make up 29% percent of
the total gunspall artifacts there, and 20% of the total gunflint category. At St. Joseph, of 109
gunspalls, British gunspalls represent 15.6% of these artifacts, or 14.17% of all gunflints. Fort
Michilimackinac, on the other hand, with its 2,032 gunspalls only demonstrates a 6.84% British
gunflint presence, or 5.45% or all gunflints excavated from the site (see Tables below). This
representation may reflect the issues of supply at these various sites, as well as duration of
residence of inhabitants, as the British at Fort de Chartres, for example, only manned this fort
officially for seven years, and had to supply it by a long, arduous journey down the Ohio River.
French goods travelling up the Mississippi to the same fort could take a month as well. Fort
Michilimackinac, as the supplier of Ouiatenon and St. Joseph, on the other hand, may have
purchased French stores or acquired French stockpiles of gunflints upon the surrender of that fort
and continued to buy from the French traders.
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Gunspalls as % of entire assemblage

73.56%

87.10%

Fort de Chartres
Fort St. Joseph
Fort Michilimackinac

90.91%

Fort Ouiatenon

91.56%

Figure 15: Gunspall Representation within Entire Assemblages

British Gunspalls as represented in
entire assemblage
0
5.82%
Fort de Chartres
Fort St. Joseph
14.17%

Fort Michilimackinac

22.50%

Fort Ouiatenon

Figure16: British Gunspall Representation within Entire Assemblages
(Note: The reports on Fort Ouiatenon’s assemblage did not distinguish between French and
British gunspalls, so no differentiation between these could be used for this graph.)
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Figure 17: Gunspalls and Total Gunspall Assemblages at all Four Sites

Gunspalls clearly represented the majority of gunflints found from the four fortifications
represented within this study. Only Fort de Chartres’s assemblage numbered less than eightyseven percent gunspalls. Perhaps only due to its small sample size, it numbered less than
seventy-five percent. This difference may, of course, also reflect the difference in time frames
and lengths of British occupation or conceivably a manifestation of potential differences in
logistical issues. Further examination of key ordnance documents might reveal this answer.
Similarly, gunspalls that demonstrate characteristics likely to denote British manufacturing show
a much higher percentage at Fort de Chartres than at other the other forts, potentially, again,
related to temporal or logistical contexts. In the absence of any differentiation between British
and French made in the Ouiatenon assemblage, a more thorough examination would allow more
conclusive comparisons, and their inclusion in future discussions. Similarly, the accessibility of
specific measurements of the different types of gunflints, spalls and blades, French and British,
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through open access documents or even through documentary sources would allow specific
comparisons to continue as well as to help answer other research questions. For example, the
British gunflints at Fort de Chartres, although a small sample at this point, measured both larger
in length and wider across, statistically, than the French gunspalls. Detailed relative data from
other sites could allow the potential of tracing supplies across logistical routes, the noting of
variables across sites, or other possible research questions. At this point, however, the
information does not exist.
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CHAPTER V: GUNFLINT PREFERENCE
Apparent “Preference” for Gunflints
Little investigation has been completed regarding any potential preference patterns of
European, or even indigenous, gunflints by the various nations involved in the Illinois Country
over the 17th and 18th century. As the variety of options expanded, the possibility of differences
in sparking capability of one style of gunflint, or one type of stone itself, might find itself
reflected in the archaeological or historical record. Historical sources could, potentially, denote
these preferences or sparking results. Archaeologically, if a pattern of use wear from firing can
be determined, linked to a model of firearm, for example, Charleville or Brown Bess, and
specific styles of gunflints, like gunspalls or blades, a further link could be made to the nation of
manufacture for the gunflint itself. Other than Hamilton and Emory (1988), only Kenmotsu
(1990) and Quinn (2010) have performed experimental research to investigate the possibility of
uniform use wear patterns which might help to eventually aid in gunflint identification.
Both Kenmotsu and Quinn provided a general outline of wear usage in their results. Neither
of these studies, however sufficiently addressed the issues of raw materials and production
techniques in the examination (Quinn, 2004:66). Quinn, for example, did illustrate evidence of
crushing, polishing, and blunting upon gunflints fired, but the gunflints used in the test were
modern recreations, and the firearms used a modern, but homemade, replica (2010:251).
Granted, period gunflints and flintlocks are potentially too valuable and fragile for a study such
as this, but comparatively, both studies leave open the possibility that gunflints manufactured by
hand, utilizing tools made of modern materials, employing flintlocks from that period, rather
than modern reproductions, with modern metal compositions, might have different sparking
results and different wear patterns.
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Still, the potential is there for use-wear analysis to demonstrate different nation’s habits and
traditions of utilizing particular styles of gunflints or resultant effects upon particular types of
lithic material. As will be discussed later in this chapter, especially in the later eighteenth
century, little uniformity seemed to exist among the published manuals regarding a preferred
method of fixing flints, and at times, contradictory information was presented. Microscopic
analysis, while currently “unreliable,” could help to show different uses in “varying regional and
cultural contexts” (Quinn, 2010:250).
Austin (2011) notes other factors that might, as well, have an impact upon use wear evidence
of gunflints. Soldiers and civilians upon the frontier would routinely utilize several methods to
extend the lives of their gunflints, especially if in a place, like the frontier, where supply might
be haphazard, and sparks might mean the difference between life and death. Retouching
gunflints occurred regularly, but so also did the rotating of flints in the cock to get a different
angle, and simply flipping the flint over as a means to lengthen the life of a gunflint (Austin,
2011:93).
While use-wear analysis could, indeed, demonstrate reuse, the elongation of the life of the
gunflint, retouching, and simply the life history of the ordinary gunflint, the number of variables
involved in this type of research demonstrates it’s difficult at the present state. The composition
of the particular type of stone, the structure of the frizzen, the manner of manufacture of frizzens:
variables involved with the forging, file finishing, and heat treating, in addition to the varieties of
material impurities and re-facing with other materials (David Williams, personal
communication), and even the method in which the gunflint was placed within the cock of the
lock itself can all affect wear on the gunflint. The tightness of the cock and the angle which the
gunflint strikes the frizzen itself, with other factors, “affect microscopic and macroscopic use-
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wear patterns more than intensity of use” (Quinn, 2010:250). So, while valuable, the sheer
number of variables to be considered which affect the use-wear of gunflints makes attributing a
style or lithic to a particular nation of origin or use fairly insurmountable, given today’s
technology and techniques. Many of these factors will be outlined later.
In the absence of documentary evidence clearly stating a preference of one nation for one
particular type of flint, or trade records requesting purchase of particular types of gunflints, it
remains an assumption that French flints, for example, are linked to French sites only. Heldman,
for example, in his excavation at Fort Toulouse, Alabama, believes “it is reasonable to assume
that the French preferred to use their own flints, flints that their British enemy conceded to be the
better of the two types” (Heldman, 1973:166). He also claimed a later American preference for
French gun flints, yet provides no documentary or archaeological reference for this. Perhaps this
could be linked to a general boycott of all things British, but if the flints performed well and/or
the British produced them at such a level that they “were able to eclipse France in the mass
production of gunflints,” by the late 18th century (Austin, 2011:86) it would seem unreasonable,
as well, that the American would not have used these flints. Clearly, further study remains in
terms of both the documentary and archaeological records. A deeper inquiry into the records of
the Board of Ordnance, into the letters between officers and the Board, and even between
commanding officers might reveal key characteristics about the functionality of particular styles,
lithic material, or deficiencies in certain gunflints.
In their exhaustive study of gunflints, and their sparking qualities, from the Fort
Michilimackinac assemblage, Hamilton and Emery set out to “determine the source of gunflints
used for 18th-century firearms in North America and to give reasons why gunflints from some
sources apparently were preferred over ones from other sources.” To do this, they utilized
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samples viewed under petrographic microscopes and x-ray diffraction, as well as photographs of
spark showers, which they then measured (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:I, 246). As generally
happens, better quality photographic technology exists today that might refine some of their
conclusions and recent testing that utilizes inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICPMS) further reinforces the differences in the chemical composition of the lithic materials (Durst,
2009:22). Ascertaining and utilizing quarry sources in Britain and France will only help to
connect samples with these gunflints found at colonial sites, thereby enabling better conclusions
relating to use, supply, and other related issues.
Hamilton and Emery conclude that the British army clearly desired French flake gunflints
whenever possible, and alluded to the idea that this stretched into spall-style gunflints as well
(1988:2). They offer no primary documentation or historical data to justify these statements, and
further note that the difficulties in separating the British and French contexts at Fort
Michilimackinac demonstrate a difficulty in separating a dependable use pattern.
The conclusion of British usage of French flakes rests heavily upon the archaeological
assemblage found at Fort Frederica, in Georgia, a site that was inhabited by the British from
1736 until 1749. As with many British frontier forts, the logistical issues of supplying items like
gunflints would prove difficult throughout the eighteenth century. The British there utilized only
French flakes, 113 of them excavated, (because the British did not make their own yet), and 278
gunspalls, of which 275 were deemed of English origin, based on the type of flint and method of
manufacturing (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:184). One key difference in the gunspall
manufacturing between Michilimackinac and Frederica lay in the type of stone used, for at
Frederica, ballast flint often was fashioned into gunspalls (White, 1975:71; Luedtke, 1998:35,
Burdette, et.al., 2014:106). Proximity to shipping provides the key to this difference. These
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interior forts did not have the access to ballast flint, and had to rely on the imported shipments of
gunflints from places like upriver from New Orleans, down the Ohio from Fort Pitt, or from
Michilimackinac.
Another suggestion for the British reliance on gunspalls lay in an adaptation of technology.
While primary documentary evidence for the conclusions of the study remain problematic, and
due to a lack of intact gunlocks, with gunflints intact, in the archaeological record, Donald Baird
(1981) demonstrates that the British may have altered the structure of their lock itself in order to
accommodate the uneven nature of the gunspall. The main characteristic of gunspalls, again, lay
in the bulb of percussion which creates a dome, or hump, upon one surface. This hump forced
users to wrap the rear of the flint in leather or lead in order to gain a more secure, and tighter,
grip by the vise of the cock (Baird, 1981:82-83; Simes, 1777:2). This uneven surface prompted
the French to eventually switch to the blade gunflint, which had to even surfaces, allowing the
cock to grip the blade tightly, which allowed a more consistent spark.

Figure 18: Brown Bess 1755/6 Land Pattern Cock, Lower-Jaw Basin (courtesy of Dr. David
Williams)

Baird noticed an inexplicable basin found in the lower jaws of British military muskets of
the period and speculated that this would allow for the accommodation of the dome, when

81

mounted “face” up, which resulted from the percussion strike which manufactured the gunspall.
Again, archaeological evidence is scant, and gunlocks with flints still in place are relatively rare,
and spall positioning has varied between indigenous, French, and English specimens. Part of this
difficulty, however, lay in the fact that not all can conclusively be classified as British military
locks, or demonstrate sufficient corrosion that the basin itself is potentially obscured. Still, as
late at 1796, the Frenchman Citizen Dolomieu deemed the long side of a blade gunflint as the
underside, and the short side, the seat (Baird, 1981:83).
Few contemporary researchers outside of Baird’s 1981 article have made note of this
basin. Written correspondence with firearm experts, Dr. David Williams, Mr. David Harding,
and Dr. Erik Goldstein (2017), and examinations of dateable gunlocks within their purviews,
have suggested that the existence of these basins confirms the premise of Baird’s argument. Post
1740s British musket locks appeared to have this innovation, and retained it through the 1820s,
post-blade/platform gunflint adoption. While archaeological and documentary evidence needs
much more investigation to confirm, it would appear that the basins were retained beyond the
adoption of blade gunflints, potentially to exhaust gunspall supplies. While hardly conclusive,
the existence of these basins in the lower jaw of the cock of British military muskets does
suggest a potential solution to the ill fit of gunspalls within the cock, and why the British took
longer to develop their own mode of the blade technology.

Preference for Flints?
If, indeed, the British preferred to use the French flints when possible, as numerous
authors suggest, a demonstrable reason for this preference must exist. Hamilton and Emery’s
study attempted to ascertain if sparking capability determined that preference, if French or
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British gunflints produced the necessary sparks, or more consistent sparks, that would make the
difference between life and death upon the frontier. This part of the study involved photographs
of the showers of sparks produced by the striking of flint against a steel frizzen of an “antique”
gun. The test involved pictures of the first twenty snaps of the lock, and alternating shots
through the fiftieth snap. Of note, however is that they did not use an 18 th century lock, for “it
probably could not have withstood the punishment” (1988:100-101). While this certainly rings
true, it must be noted that this speaks of some of the many variables which may have influenced
the sparks involved in this test. For example, this “antique” gun and lock, a French made Liège
musket assembled between 1811 and 1853, may have originated in a time period fairly close to
that of the Land Pattern Brown Bess of the 18th Century, but key components may be different.
For example, its frizzen may be steel rather than the case hardened iron frizzen of which a
French Charleville or British Brown Bess would have had, or the springs of the lock mechanism
may have had different tensions. There is also no guarantee that the gunflints typically used
within those muskets would react similarly in this type of test. Regardless, the test involved
French flakes and spalls, English spalls and flakes, and Indian “chip” gunflints.
The photos revealed some interesting results, with one of the most predictable results
being the unpredictability of the spark arrays. From one shot to the next, for example, Hamilton
and Emery comment that the prediction of the next spark array’s size, large or small, simply
could not be foretold. Of a more advantageous note, the total length of spark arrays for spalls
diminished over time-use for gunspalls, but “may increase” for flakes (Hamilton and Emery,
1988:121). For a soldier or civilian on the frontier, the dependability of a shower of sparks
which would ignite the priming power was paramount. If, indeed, as Hamilton and Emery’s test
conclude, that spark array lengths increased for flake gunflints (no distinction is made between
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British and French flakes), clearly those depending upon such technology would have quickly
adopted this more advantageous style, yet the authors had pointed out earlier that wherever the
French were involved in colonial affairs, “French spalls outnumbered French flakes in ratios of 3
or more to 1” (Hamilton and Emery, 1988:32). Clearly, either other factors affect the preference
for spalls over flakes, or other factors affected the results of sparking in the eighteenth century.
At this same time, little standardization, or even testing, was conducted by the British military
during this period the bulk of the eighteenth century. David Williams (personal communication)
suggests that unless a quartermaster had come up through the ranks, and had intimate knowledge
of the pros and cons of particular makes of gunflints, advantages in terms of sparking capabilities
would only come through the choices of individual soldiers and their choices through purchase
or trade at the local level.
With that in mind, the averages for sparking and spark arrays between the French and
English spalls and flakes, and the indigenous gunflints revealed interesting results. Hamilton and
Emery conclude that the gunflints which performed best, under these test conditions at least,
were the French spalls and flakes, followed by the English versions, and lastly, the nativeproduced gunflints. Even with that, averages of the results demonstrated an equivalence of
French and British spark production, which still calls into question the issue of the authors
presumed assumption for a British preference for French flakes, although the supposition of a
technological advantage to a better “seated” flake between the jaws of the cock resulting from
the even surfaces of a flake seem reasonable, even while not demonstrable (Hamilton and Emery,
1988:152, 121).
Additionally, to better seat the flake style of gunflint, soldiers would often wrap the
gunflint with a thin piece of lead or leather in order for the vice jaws to gain more purchase,
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allowing a tighter grip. This would allow for a better spark. Thomas Simes, writing in 1777,
note that “they should be screwed in firm, between a thin piece of lead, it having them surer hold
than leather, &c” (Simes, 1777:2). Examples of these lead “flint sheaths” have been found
archaeologically, most notably at Michilimackinac, behind the British occupied “House F,”
whose garden also revealed spall and blade gunflints (Heldman and Grange, 1981:229)
From this, then, reinforces the concept that other variables and factors exist beyond mere
sparking ability, or that the composition of the materials of eighteenth century muskets may
produce different results. Lastly, the concept of dry firing was not explored. As David Williams
pointed out in a personal communication, merely measuring sparks does not take into account
the “effect of the ignition in the pan” on the flint. If, indeed, eighteenth century muskets, using
wrought iron frizzens and pans, somehow produced different spark arrays that actually affected
the ignition of the priming powder within the pan, then a clear argument for preference of
particular styles of flints of a particular national manufacture might be made.

Variables Affecting Performance
An abundance of variables could affect performance of gunflints, and thus, influence
individuals and governments’ choices and preferences. The manner in which the gunflint fits
within the cock, as previously mentioned, affects how it strikes the frizzen as well as the
resulting spark array, but so also do a number of other factors. The shape of the clamp and size
of the gunflint in relation to the frizzen, the tightness of the vice on the cock, how the flint itself
“sits” within the vice, its speed in striking the frizzen, and especially the hardness/composition of
the frizzen can all affect the sparking capability, and thus performance, of the humble gunflint.
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Lithic Composition
Hamilton and Emery’s study, which utilized petrographic analysis, first attempted to
identify the nation of origin of gunflint through an examination of those at Michilimackinac.
Comparisons made with other samples from Fort Frederica helped to corroborate results, and
they believed that they could ascertain the microscopic differences between gunflints deemed
French and British, based largely upon the coarseness of the grain matrices and the presence of
bryozoans or other organic materials (Hamilton and Emery 1988:246; Durst, 2009:20).
Santonian samples, essentially, were designated as French and Campanian to be English. As
Durst’s studies later reveal, however, both series of stone exist in outcroppings in both mainland
Europe and within Great Britain, making this early study’s conclusions somewhat dubious
(Durst, 2009:20). Still, Durst utilized newer technological techniques, inductively coupled
plasma-mass spectrometry, on samples that did enable the distinction of subtle “variations in the
chemical composition” which demonstrated characteristics particular from one region to another
(Durst, 2009:22). While this could certainly help studies in the future, did it impact individual
choices in lithic material for gunflints in the eighteenth century?
As related to color, which will be discussed later, the translucence and fine-grained flints
from France had a perception, at least, of producing superior sparks (Austin, 2011:87). The
greater homogeneity of French stone, due in part to their specific mining focus, helped to
reinforce, at least, a perceived reliability because of this standardized color and form. The more
coarse-grained, variable-colored stones which often contained inclusions seemed to cause doubt
in the reliability of sparking in purchasers.
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Lock Speed
The speed at which the flint strikes the frizzen impacts both wear upon the flint and the
shower of sparks it produces. When the trigger is pulled, the spring-loaded cock flies forward,
and shoves the flint against the frizzen, which is also spring-loaded. That scrape along the
frizzen produces the dual-action of forcing the frizzen back, which exposes the priming powder,
and the friction scrape generates the shower of sparks, which are actually molten particles of iron
scraped off of the frizzen, necessary to ignite the priming powder. Key to all of this sequence
happening successfully is the timing and speed of the lock. Pletcher’s study of locks (1991) also
incorporated the seating of the gunflint, whether bevel side facing up or down.
In this experiment, Pletcher utilized “chipped” English flints and “sawed” agate flints
(1991:66). No discussion is made as to the style of flint, whether blade or gunspall. The study
focuses solely upon lock speed. Also of note, the four locks used in this study all post-date the
French and Indian War, and discussion of these timings, then, as they relate to the Brown Bess or
Charleville may need much further study and elaboration to conclude if these findings have
relevance to this particular discussion. Still, Pletcher concludes that the longer the frizzen
scrape, the “more consistent the lock,” which produced a greater quality of spark (1991:67). In
“early” locks, Pletcher believes that fast lock speeds produced a higher velocity of the flint edge,
which resulted from the strength of the springs within said locks. High flint speeds and fast
locks, then, would provide the uniformity and dependability that gun makers wanted and users
needed (1991:80). Again, a specific comparison between French and English muskets, between
trade guns and fowlers, could shed additional light upon the issue, and may help us to understand
a potential difference between sparking reliability between spalls and blades.
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The Frizzen and Cock Composition
As noted previously, the composition of the frizzen also factors into the reliability of the
sparking mechanism. As the gunflint strikes and scrapes along the frizzen, several factors related
to its structure and alignment comes into play. The case hardened wrought iron of which the
frizzen is made needs to be both hard and soft, for “a frizzen too hard or too soft will give poor
results” (Luedtke, 1999:72). If the frizzen is too hard, it will cause too much damage and wear
to the gunflint. Too soft, and its sparking capability is reduced. Just as the composition of the
frizzen is important, so also is the arrangement of its parts. The frizzen must easily snap back as
the gunflint scrapes across it to reveal the priming powder. The shape of the hammer/cock, and
even the curvature of the frizzen, as well as the distance of its throw as the gunflint descends all
factor into the sparking capability. “If the spring is wound too tight it can drive the flint too
forcefully and shatter it” (Kenmotsu, 1990:104). The metal parts of the lock must work in
harmony with the gunflint itself in order to yield the requite sparking. The raw material of that
gunflint, too, must cause minimal damage to the iron parts while yielding maximum sparks
(Luedtke, 1999:73, Smith, 1982b:162). In other words, use wear happens. The ability to create
these sparking involved a wide variety of factors, all of which had the potential to impact the
diverse types of muskets and firearms utilized within the North American frontier. This has the
potential to affect choices and preferences in the selection of gunflints by those involved.

Did Color Matter?
As discussed previously, the assignment, archaeologically, of a gunflint to a particular
nation of manufacture based on its color remains problematic. While color does not distinctively
represent mechanical properties, questions abound whether flint colors could indicate advantages
or disadvantages in lithic properties. Historically, yellow, or honey, blade gunflints have been
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attributed to France with black or gray gunflints to Britain, but a much more diverse range of
‘colors’ of gunflints exist in the American colonies, and similar veins of stone exist in both
France and Britain which could yield similar colors of gunflints (Durst, 2009:20; Stevenson, et.
al., 2007:57). Luedtke (1999:73) points out as well that black and gray stones exist in Denmark,
Sweden, and Germany, as well as France, while the honey-color usually deemed to be French
has also been found in Italy. Like Durst, Luedtke recommends the examination of microfossils
and grain size, as well as mode of manufacture in any attempt to assign national origin to
gunflints.
Still, eighteenth century manufacturers and consumers would have made note of some of
the characteristics of different colored stones, if indeed, they yielded different firing results. The
French scientist Déodat Gratet de Dolomieu, writing in 1796, noted that the good fire flints
varied from honey yellow to blackish brown, but that the “different shades in the masses of flint
have no effect on their ability to serve as gunflints. It is the uniformity of their color when
reduced to thin pieces” that demonstrated the standardized colors typical of French flints
(1960:53). Thus, once flaked, the consistency of color in French stone, as well as its semitransparent qualities, seemed to suggest a more viable product. At the same time, a French
military contract from 1740, 56 years before, required grayish flint for its gunflints (Luedtke,
1999:73). Dolomieu suggests that blond stones are more fragile that brownish ones, and that the
brownish ones both spark more strongly but the battery [frizzen] of the lock to deteriorate a little
more quickly” (1960:54). Perhaps this last quality caused some of the preference in desirability
of the honey-yellow stones.
If color, or, for that matter, translucency and luster are desirable qualities, did they link to
technological benefits for the resulting gunflint? Luedtke (1999:74) believes in the possibility.
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Inclusions of different colors or textures could represent flaws. Differences in grain size might
have a role resulting in variances in luster or translucency which could have an effect in breakage
or sparking capability (1999:74). These same characteristics could cause the flint to be too
brittle, a trait undesirable in a gunflint as “the hardest flints are generally the best” according to a
London writer in 1819 (Woodward, 1982:141). So, while color clearly seemed to matter, and
impacted producers and consumers’ attitudes towards particular gunflints, in reality, it would
appear that the color largely had little to do with the actual quality and function of the gunflint.
If that is the case, other factors must have come into play when selecting particular styles and
colors of gunflints.
One of the more exhaustive discussions of these factors comes from Luedtke, who
suggests that gunflint choices/preferences need to be examined on issues beyond just their
functional characteristics. “After all, a Porsche and a Nissan Sentra both perform the same
technological function in our culture, but they differ enormously in cost and symbolism”
(Luedtke, 1999:71). Incorporating a much broader view, which could help us to understand what
was going on in the colonial interior, Luedtke suggests that some of the physical traits of the
gunflints themselves had symbolic significance to those that made them and those that bought
and used them. Thus, inclusion into the ideological realm, beyond just cost, may have impacted
consumer choice, especially as these gunflints served as an important trade item at these interior
forts for both the French and British.

Influences upon Gunflint Availability in the Interior

In addition to questioning the issue of preference, or the desirability of particular nations in
obtaining particular styles, colors, or types of gunflints, we must also look at the practicality of
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obtaining such goods while in the deep interior of the North American colonies. The discussions
of the artifacts, to date, have done little to discuss the impact of the history upon the availability
of particular types or styles of gunflints in the interior. A discussion of the specific assemblages
found at these inland military, civilian, and indigenous sites should also consider the influence of
political and economic events upon the trade and supply patterns of the British, French, Spanish,
and later, Americans.
The British, for example, fought a succession of global conflicts during the late 17 th and
throughout the 18th centuries which would have impacted and influenced the availability of both
gunspalls, and later, blades-type gunflints. King William’s War (1688-1697), Queen Anne’s
War/War of Spanish Succession (1702-1713), the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720),
the War of Jenkin’s Ear (against Spain, 1739-1742), the War of Austrian Succession (17421748), the Seven Years War/French & Indian War (1754-1763), Pontiac’s Rebellion (17631766), and the American Revolution (1775-1783) would have involved Britain and France, their
colonial cohorts, and indigenous allies. These political and military events clearly would have
impacted trade patterns and the availability of gunflints within the interior of the continent.
Similarly, economic issues would also have impacted the ability of the colonists and military
officials to obtain needed gunflints. Disruptions of trade by war, embargoes, or simply logistics
would have affected the supply of gunflints at these sites. Prior to the French and Indian War
(1754-1763), for example, the British ruled their colonies through a form of salutary neglect, an
unofficial policy that allowed lax enforcement of laws and tax collection. This policy also
involved very little in the ways of a formal, professional, military presence within their Atlantic
colonies, and instead they relied upon provincial militias. After this war, however, British
officials would have curtailed the availability of French trade goods and enforced strict
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importation of British goods. The Stamp Act (1765), Revenue Act (1767), and resultant boycotts
and nonimportation agreements by American colonists would also have impacted trade and trade
goods availability. General Gage, for example, complains to Lord Barrington, the Secretary of
War about the colonial response to the Townshend Acts of 1767. “There is nothing new to
inform your Lordship of about Importation; Committees of Merchants … continue to exercise
the Government they have set up, to prohibit the Importation of British Goods…and enforce
their Prohibitions by coercive Measures” (Carter, 1969:530). Nonimportation agreements, these
boycotts of British goods, may have impacted the supplies available for purchase within these
colonies by the British military suppliers, and this politico-economic interference lasted
throughout the time that these interior forts saw ownership by the British.
At Michilimackinac and other prominent French sites, Hamilton and Emery, again, have
determined that French spalls outnumber French flakes in ratios of three or more to one
(1988:32). They also conclude, based on uncited sources, that the British obviously utilized
French flakes and spalls when possible. If blades held the clear advantages of being held tighter
in the vise than the domed spalls, why would this ratio be so skewed into these later decades?
Political and economic events, however, would have clearly impacted both of these issues. The
French ceded their North American territories to the British with the Treaty of Paris, which
ended the Seven Years War, in 1763. From that point, some were allowed to stay within their
previous habitations, like at Fort Michilimackinac, but the majority either fled or were forced to
leave for the, now, Spanish territories west of the Mississippi. While the French had utilized the
flake style as early as 1663 (Blanchette, 1975:43), it did not become a standard for the French
military for another sixty-eighty years. Whether expensive, spurned, or unattainable within the
North American colonies, by the time of their routine use in places like Michilimackinac, spall
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gunflints had had decades of use and would clearly outnumber them in the assemblages
(Faulkner, 1986:84).
With the French traders still occupying houses within Michilimackinac, St. Joseph, and
Ouiatenon, but ousted from Fort de Chartres, the artifactual assemblages might demonstrate
small, but noticeable changes. The British certainly may have seen the advantage in buying from
French traders, utilizing French blades for their advantages over spalls (especially as they had yet
to develop this style), or bought French spalls simply due to their supply and cost. Indian agents
at Fort de Chartres routinely purchased supplies, including gunflints, from local traders, and
there is no reason to suspect that those at Michilimackinac did not. The difference, however, lay
in the fact that only a British trading company existed within Fort de Chartres’ walls, as opposed
to the multitude of French civilian traders who were permitted to live and thrive there.
With three of the four sites examined in this study, the British occupation lasted only a very
short time until the British abandoned their fortifications or the Americans took over during, or
after, the Revolutionary War. American forces never occupied these fortifications, and
American soldiers essentially utilized French and locally produced gunflints in their weapons.
As a result, these assemblages should reflect the accessibility of British and/or French gunspalls
and blade gunflints through offering a very specific reflection of this time period. Similarly,
resultant effects upon shipping for the French and British, as they attempted to supply these
interior forts through New Orleans or across land to Michilimackinac or from Fort Pitt (now,
Pittsburgh), may have impacted the styles, forms, or types of raw material from which the
gunflints originated, and the availability of particular gunflints at these remote posts.
Logistical issues for the British would hamper their efforts to equip and maintain the forts
won from the French at the end of the Seven Years (French and Indian) War in 1763. General
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Gage, who commanded the British forces in North America after 1763, repeatedly noted his
difficulties in supplying the interior colonies. Michilimackinac, for example, proved the easiest
of the four from this study to supply, but that, too, proved no small task. In a letter to Thomas
Whately, then Secretary to the Treasury in the Grenville administration, Gage complained about
the logistical issues, noting that supplies from England were “Loaded and Unloaded Twenty
times, to be Transported in Vessels Boats and Waggons [sic.]” (Carter, 1969:279). Still,
transportation from wagon to schooner, which travelled across the Great Lakes from Montreal to
Michilimackinac, would prove much easier than to the other forts.
Transportation issues would compound at the more interior forts of Ouiatenon and St.
Joseph, but even those saw resupply from Michilimackinac, along the waterways of Lake
Michigan and the roughly 130 miles overland between Fort St. Joseph and Fort Ouiatenon.
These distances and difficulties paled when compared to the complications of supplying Fort de
Chartres, which featured prominently into complaints of risings costs and problematic
conveyance routes. The French had supplied their fort by journeying seventy days up the
Mississippi from New Orleans, crossing some 1,700 miles with their goods (Alvord and Carter,
1916:302). With good relations with the indigenous populations, this journey would prove much
easier and French goods were always reported to be sold more cheaply, by some accounts, thirtypercent cheaper (Carter, 1931:215). This, in itself, might help to explain the presence of
significant numbers of French goods within the Fort de Chartres artifact assemblage.
The British lacked that advantage for much of their tenure at Fort de Chartres, and lacking
the port of New Orleans, which sat in Spanish hands post-French and Indian War, were forced to
rely on shipping goods down the Ohio from Fort Pitt. The cost and trials of this passage proved
tedious to General Gage, as well as the British traders involved in the Illinois Country. After
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unloading goods at New York, supplies travelled ninety miles to Philadelphia, and then another
320 miles to Fort Pitt. From Fort Pitt, large batteaus (boats) needed construction to transport the
goods the 1,100-1,200 mile trip to Fort de Chartres, assuming, of course, that the Ohio River
proved navigable at that time of year. Transportation proved difficult due to the seasons, for
flooding occurred in the spring, and levels dropped in the fall, allowing for “two Months in the
Spring and about two Months, in the Fall of the Year” to send troops and supplies to the Illinois
Country (Alvord and Carter, 1916:226, 473; Carter, 1969:381). Notwithstanding the hazards of
river travel, the British also faced dangers from the inhabitants of the interior, for “the French,
have at all Times, the fairest opportunity of inducing inimical Indians, to cut Off the Supplys of
Provissions [sic.]” (Alvord and Carter, 1916:473). Numerous incidents of violent encounters
between the British and indigenous populations occurred as the British attempted the
transportation of supplies to Fort de Chartres during their brief tenure there.
As stated previously, the gunflint assemblage from Fort de Chartres demonstrated a unique
pattern when compared to these other period fortifications. Fort Michilimackinac, with its vast
number of gunflints, showed only a 6.84% compilation of British-designated gunflints
(gunspalls), and these only represented 5.45% of the total gunflints excavated at that site.
Perhaps the ease with which French traders, who inhabited the fort itself, could obtain supplies
like gunflints, coupled with the added costs of transporting British goods to the fort contributed
to this skewed artifact assemblage. At the other end of this spectrum, however lay Fort de
Chartres, where stores perpetually ran low, the costs of transportation costs and risks were high,
and the future of the fort itself always lay in limbo. Gage writes to Lord Hillsborough, the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1769, “A great many Stores with an Addition of Artillery
and Ammunition are demanded for the Service of the Ilinois [sic.], but it appears best, to
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postpone everything of this Nature, ‘till His Majesty’s final Determination respecting that
Country shall be known” (Carter, 1931:235). British gunspalls represented 29% of the total
gunspall assemblage, and 20% of the total gunflint category. With costs dear, and the risks and
difficulty of transportation high, the British still appeared to rely less upon French goods at Fort
de Chartres, particularly in the realm of military goods. The uncertain nature of their tenure
there, as opposed to Michilimackinac, may have caused them to prolong usage of things like
gunflints, to more stringently curtail their waste and use, and encourage reuse or retouching of
their firing edges. Perhaps, then, the British did utilize French gunspalls and flakes due to their
technological advantages, but an alternative might also simply be expediency.

Choice may

have factored into their use of French gunflints, but the practicality of obtaining this necessary
material so far from their bases of operation along the east coast may have driven them to use
French gunflints by the chronological period when they did have the technological option.

Supplying Gunflints—The British
The British clearly struggled during the mid to late 17th century with their early
manufacturing of gunflints. Not until the early 1720s, with Ordnance system of supply and its
Board, which dealt with these logistical issues, purchasing, and distribution, and the contracts for
their gunflints would some of the issues be dealt with, especially until they developed the
capability of producing some of their own internally. Early gunflint contractors obtained their
supplies, largely, through Dutch middlemen. The Dutch merchant fleet, through much of this
same time period, dominated that of France and Britain, and gave the Dutch great economic
strength. Early production of firearms centered with the Low Countries, or Dutch and Germans
producers, and both France and Britain imported what they needed. De Lotbiniere contends that
the Dutch lacked good flint on any real scale, and Clarke suggests that the Dutch “are seen
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purchasing vast stores of flints and drawing the customary large profits in their capacity of arms
racketeers” (Blanchette, 1975:48; De Lotbiniere, 1987:156; Clarke, 1935:40). With the Dutch as
middlemen, at first, supplying both France and Britain with gunflints and weaponry, this tenuous
balance would change in the late 17th century, as the Netherlands and France go to war,
compelling France to develop their own firearm and gunflint industries.
The French would then operate as the main supplier of British gunflints, at least until
such time as the British could, or would, establish their own standardized gunflint industry. The
Hudson’s Bay fur trading company routinely purchased items like gunflints from French, rather
than British, suppliers. In 1691, a letter from their Committee stated, “& particularly to be
spareing [sic.] in your Flints (tho' it seems a very small thing) and in your brandy, they both
being French comodities [sic.] and hard to come by.” Other documents specifically list gunflints
from France as key items shipped to these interior fur trade posts (Christianson, 1982:39). With
France and Britain fighting throughout much of the late 17th and 18th centuries, through a
succession of global conflicts, only France existed to supply the accoutrement necessary for war
in the scale Britain needed. Yet, wouldn’t France have been reluctant to supply her enemy?
Perhaps this was the case, or perhaps British military purchasers at the Board of Ordnance
continued to utilize middlemen, for as late as the 1730s, over 2.5 million musket flints, in various
sizes, were imported from France by a London gun maker working for the Board of Ordnance
(De Lotbiniere, 1987:156; Bailey, 2009:253). In Birmingham, as a result, came the growth of
the gun industry, with the birth of the eighteenth century, as Britain attempted to supply her own
needs (Williams, 2010).
Britain began to manufacture gunflints shortly after France, by the middle of the 17 th
century, in addition to utilizing the “French lock,” and derivatives based upon it, within their
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infant gun industry. In 1655, a London gun maker, Roger Carlisle, was tasked by Oliver
Cromwell to provide 11,000 flints, and five years later, another, George Fisher, contracted to
supply the Board of Ordnance with “5000 flint-stones by him cutt [sic.] and brought into store”
(De Lotbiniere, 1977:42). De Lotbiniere asserts that these individuals operated as the
middlemen between the knappers and the Board, rather than as knappers themselves. This
industry continued to develop over the next fifty years. As early as 1704, a warrant from the
Board of Ordnance was issued for “240,000 ‘English Flints for musquett’” (De Lotbiniere,
1987:156). This, at least, implies that an English mode of production, if not style of gunspall,
had begun and began to offer competition to the French imports. With the spread of gunspall
production in Britain, and the continued surface collection of flint itself, the issue of quality
threatened to hamper domestic production. This, especially when combined with the increased
demand caused by the French and Indian War/Seven Years War (1754-1763) caused difficulties
for the Board of Ordnance in satisfying their gunflint needs.
The quality of the gunflints produced in Britain caused consternation amongst those who
used them. By 1758, quality suffered, and “nearly half of the flints delivered ‘have been rejected
on account of their shape or colour, though they believe them to be serviceable, but said that by
the strictness of the present View there will not be a number sufficient for His Majesty’s
Service.’” Soft stones, picked from the surface, easily crumbled and flaked, and did not meet the
needs of the military (Bailey, 2009:252). Lord Colvill, a naval officer, wrote the Board in 1757
complaining of similar issues as they journeyed to attack Louisbourg, stating that “three or four
Musquets out of six frequently misfire occasioned by the Badness of the Flints” (Durnford,
1757). In fact, General Gage would write on the eve of the American Revolution, complaining
that “‘The Ordnance Flints have at all times been reckoned so bad, that the regiments generally
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supply themselves; and if the [regimental] Agents shou’d be ordered to send five or six thousand
of the famous Kentish Flints to their respective Corps, it wou’d be of Use, and no great expence
to them’” (Bailey, 2009:253). Commanders frequently requested French flints (whether spall or
blade is not known), due to this unreliability, and many company officers dealt with this issue by
purchasing gunflints from traders for their men privately. Only further research into the
documents of the Ordinance Office, and those of the traders buying and selling gunflints, will
yield the potential answer to the question of preference.
Regardless of the source of supply, soldiers needed gunflints. When the British first
arrived at Fort de Chartres, in 1765, they found neither “Ammunition nor any other Stores, that
are useually [sic.] Expected in Such a place” (Alvord and Carter, 1916:105). In the Inventory of
the Goods at Fort de Chartres, categorized by the French commissary and verified by James
Rumsey, the regimental commissary, no mention of gunflints exists (Alvord and Carter,
1916:102-105). The French took the stores of flints, ammunition, and powder for firearms while
leaving behind the same for the fort’s artillery. The only means of creating sparks, then, were
those that the British had brought with them, in a place where they felt surrounded by hostile
natives and “indolent” French bent on causing strife. This especially rang true for Stirling’s
regiment, as the takeover of Fort de Chartres meant that they must purchase stores from the
nearby French if they hoped to maintain control over the area.
In times of peace, a British soldier was issued two gunflints per year, but by the outbreak
of war in 1755, that number rose to five gunflints per man (Bailey, 2009:254). In the case of her
interior possessions, the Crown designated somewhere between 3 and 9.5 companies to maintain
its presence in the Illinois Country (Alvord and Carter, 1916:512-513; 551). In the post French
and Indian War world, a company consisted of approximately fifty-five men. At its greatest
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population, then, Fort de Chartres required a minimum of 2,500 gunflints per year, just for its
foot soldiers. Its artillery also required gunflints, for practice and war. The Indian trade required
gunflints. In just the months of August and September of 1766, for example, the British army
contracted traders to supply over 1,040 gunflints to the Indians in the Illinois Country as gifts or
in trade (Alvord and Carter, 1916:391-3). Clearly, this particular item, manufactured in quantity,
was in high demand at this interior fort. Whether these flints represented those crafted within
Britain or purchased directly/through intermediaries from France, however, remains
undocumented.
A dearth of contemporary sources exists describing the efficacy of particular styles or
modes of gunflints of the 18th century. Of those that do discuss gunflints, most arise from the
American Revolution or Napoleonic Wars, and the latter refer mostly to blade gunflints, which
were only produced in France prior to the end of the American Revolution. From these, the flint
itself generally seems immaterial. Thomas Simes, a British Captain, notes in 1777 that the
“flints best for service are those most clear, though the colour is immaterial, as there are good
and bad of all kinds; neither too small or too thin are best, lest the first may not give good fire, or
the latter break” (1777:2). Other commentaries on flints from this period revolve, instead upon
the proper placement of the flint within the lock as a means to produce the most consistent spark
shower. Simes recommends “they should be screwed in firm, between a thin piece of lead, it
having them surer hold than leather” (1777:2). During the Napoleonic Wars, several pundits
make similar suggestions, and ascribe misfires less to the “badness of the flint” or other material
defects of the firearms, and more in a lack of “correctness in fixing the Flint”. Of note from this
source as well, the recommendation that “Each particular Flint requires therefore its own
particular mode of being fixed, so as to accommodate itself to the particular proportions and
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conformation of each particular Lock” (Adjutant General’s Office, 1811:312-3). As the British
solidified production of their black blade gunflints at the quarries in Brandon, the gunspall, and
the basin/depression within the lower jaw of the cock, had disappeared. Still, the fixing of flints,
whether bevel up/bevel-down, remains a matter of some debate to firearm aficionados even
today, this was clearly not the main concern to those that actually used these firearms.
Another consideration in regards to gunflints lay beyond the military market. With Forts
Michilimackinac, Ouiatenon, St. Joseph, and de Chartres serving as significant sites for trade and
alliance with the indigenous populations, their concerns as consumers of this product must be
taken into account. Did the raw material or style of manufacture of these gunflints matter to the
native populations with which the British and French interacted? The only evidence for these
preference lay in the consumption patterns or in specific treaty negotiations, and gunflints rarely
find specific mention in those documents. In the interior of North America, at least, the presence
of the French, who lived with and treated with these peoples, would influence the selection of
trade goods, at least by British perceptions.
Rivals in trade and sway in the post 1763-world, the British would often comment on the
Franco-indigenous relationship. From his journal to the Illinois Country in 1765, Indian agent
George Croghan worries about news that, “a Frenchman from the Ilinois passed by the Miamies
Village, towards Detroit, & told all the Indians he saw, that the King of France their Father, had
sent a large Quantity of Goods to New Orleans, for to supply his Children the Indians, in this
Country & would send them more next Year” (Alvord and Carter, 1916:8). Critically, he claims
that these peoples “have been bread up together like Children in that Country, & the French have
always adopted the Indians Customs & manners, Treated them Civily [sic.] & supplyed [sic.]
their wants generously, by which means they gained the Hearts of the Indians & commanded
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their Services, & injoyed [sic.] the Benefit of a very large Furr [sic.] Trade” (Alvord and Carter,
1916:54-55). This close relationship may have encouraged the British Indian agent within these
interior forts to continue to purchase French goods, like gunflints, as a way to placate indigenous
groups, to persist in supplying them with the goods that they were accustomed to using. With
French and British gunflints differing in shape and colors, a switch in product would certainly be
noticeable. The Hudson’s Bay Company and East Indian Company continued to buy French
flints “which their Indian customers no doubt favoured on account of earlier contact with French
traders” (De Lotbiniere, 1987:156). Similarly, this preference might not just signify allegiance to
their former French fathers, or a continuation of a technology with which they were familiar.
“Colors have ideological associations…and it is possible that some of the native peoples…may
have preferred flints of colors that were especially meaningful in the context of their own culture
(Luedtke, 1999:76). Black, yellow, and red, for example, all serve as symbolic colors within
native clothing, jewelry, and even face paints. It would certainly be reasonable that such
symbolism could be extended to items like gunflints. A more thorough examination of primary
source documentation as it relates to the papers of the traders and trading companies may reveal
these preferences.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Attempting to compare four archaeological contexts across comparative French/British
fortifications through their gunflint assemblages has demonstrated a number of issues as related
to the study of gunflints themselves. While gunflints, as a class of artifact, have been a focus of
study for some time, confusion over terminology and chronology of the technological changes
has caused difficulty in clearly assigning particular styles of manufacturing to a specific nation of
origin. Similarly, gunflints have traditionally been assigned to a nation of manufacturing origin
based largely upon their lithic color. Recent research has demonstrated that these colors
assignations, for example those traditionally assigned to the exclusive use by the British, and to a
lesser extent, the French, have been found within samples and quarries throughout both France
and Britain. Ballin (2012:119) suggests that even the terms “French and English” should be
avoided when discussing gunflints. A reliance on the descriptive characteristics, which could
allow more comparative criteria to be created, and utilized on an intra-site basis, may allow for
less confusion, and more purposeful patterns to develop.
The real struggle in examining North American colonial gunflint assemblages and
looking for patterns in usage, logistical supplies, and potential preferences in terms of styles,
lithic material, or other characteristics, lay in the issue of mixed contexts within these frontier
fortifications. With British occupations of French sites, and continued French presence within
these sites afterwards, assigning usage and deposition patterns remains extremely tenuous,
especially in the absence of secure contexts.
Comparing the Fort de Chartres gunflint collection to those at the other three
fortifications illustrates some of the issues, but also the potential, invovled with increased
scrutiny of gunflints. British gunspalls at Fort de Chartres, again, made up 29% of the total
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gunspall category, and 20% of all gunflints excavated. At the other forts, these percentages were
either roughly halved or one-fifth of the assemblage, which is a substantial decrease. Similarly,
the Fort de Chartres British gunspalls measured larger in terms of width and length than did the
comparative averages. Granted, future excavations could increase the sample size, and this
might reveal more statistics more consistent with the other three fortificaitons. Conversely, this
representation may indeed reflect the various issues of logistical supply between these forts and
Fort de Chartres. These same concepts would also help to address contemporary authors’
reliance on a stated preference by the British for French flints, and illustrate that reality reflected
less of demand than it did supply. Changes to the lock/cock jaw configuration of the Brown
Bess over the second half of the eighteenth century might similarly reflect the necessity of
gunspall supply rather than any stated preference.
The development and usage of gunflints, as well, did not exist within a vacuum. The
parallel innovations of musketry, increased changes in tactics and warfare, and colonialism
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all intertwined around this tiny little piece of
chipped flint. A thorough examination of performance problems of this technology, then, could
help us to understand better the “spurts of invention” that occurred “as new problems are
encountered and resolved” (Skibo and Schiffer, 2009:3). This could help to explain, for
example, the accommodation of the gunspall bulb through the development of the cock’s lower
jaw-basin in the British Brown Bess over the course of the mid-eighteenth century. Looking at
the issues of how the British utilized these gunspalls, why they seemed to retain this technology,
or even proved reluctant to change over to the blade/platform style as quickly as did the French,
might help us to understand more thoroughly the manufacturing, logistically, and depositional
processes.
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Similarly, a better grasp of the performance characteristics of both lock and gunflint,
those key components that “possess specific formal and behavioral properties” (LaMotta and
Schiffer, 2011:29), utilizing the technological standards and components of those centuries might
better elucidate the choices made in using these technologies. Comprehending the true sparking
qualities of French gunspalls over British, of blades over gunspall, particularly within the locks
intended, could help us to gain insights into the concepts of the technology itself, as well as why
and how it spread, became marketable, and gained meaning within the context of the colonial
military and indigenous worlds. Looking, then, specifically at the actual properties of the raw
materials, we could begin to understand how those properties affected issues such as spark
reliability and spark production which would have been so very crucial to those who depended
upon these tools for their very lives.
Future investigations into gunflints would hopefully involve much more detailed
quantitative source testing that would allow the linkage between colonial gunflints to their origin
quarries within Europe. Well dated features within archaeological sites, and their linkage to
specific British and French contexts, will allow better descriptive characteristics to be made,
detailing just which morphological features, and specific metrics, are linked to those nations’
gunflints. Similarly, specific measurements and sample digital scans of existing gunflint
collections, placed on open source or accessible sites, would allow needed cross-site comparative
data to be obtained and assessments more effectively formulated. The measurements and scans,
for example, of all Fort de Chartres gunflints currently utilized in this thesis can be accessed at:
https://kc.kobotoolbox.org/jspan/forms/agsj7bihfFRP5dXwewpHt6 . Lastly, a much more indepth examination of the documents in the collections of the Britain’s Ordnance office itself, as
well as the papers of its logistical supply line, down through the traders and military commanders
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within these forts, might help to shed additional light on the concept of preference and usage of
these various types of gunflints.
While gunflints represent only a very tiny portion of the technology of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries of colonial Britain and France, these small pieces of chipped stone
clearly impacted life on a personal, daily level all the way through the imperial planning and
implantation process. Life on the frontier, within these forts, depended upon the reliable firing of
their muskets, for food and for defense. As a valuable item of trade with the indigenous and
civilian populations and a necessary tool of trade for the military, the gunflint helped to shape the
future of empires and nations.
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